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Freud, Mannheim, and The Liberal Doctrine of Man

THE EDITOR

For a long time now liberals have been saying that religious liberalism needs a new doctrine of man. Some liberals who recognize this need want a re-statement of the historic doctrines of liberalism, in terms of contemporary thought. Others hold that we need to explore again those ideas of the Christian tradition which liberalism has to its detriment either lost or perverted. Still others believe that the new insights of biology, psychology, and sociology should now be assimilated, with a view to modifying out-moded liberal doctrines of the past. All three of these points of view are fully justified.

The three articles of the present issue of THE JOURNAL are rich in suggestions pertinent for the modification of the liberal doctrine of man, in the light of the findings of Depth Psychology and sociology. These three articles are not easy reading. At least, they cannot be read by any one who wishes either to run as he reads or to lie in a collapsed posture on the front-room lounge. They are not easy reading because they take seriously the intellectual movements they deal with. And these movements deserve to be taken seriously, since those thinkers whom Freud and Mannheim have drawn upon and those whom they have influenced have brought to light certain facts about human nature which religious liberalism must come to terms with if it is to justify its own claim to be taken seriously.

These two movements (for which the names of Freud and Mannheim may be taken as symbols) have been carrying on an investigation of the validity of eighteenth and nineteenth century rationalistic and idealistic conceptions of man and society. Neither movement, to be sure, represents a repudiation of basic confidence in man or of the guiding role of reason in human life. But both movements have shown that there is a great deal more in the human psyche than was ever dreamed of by the rationalist philosophers. And this "good deal more" they characterize as the deeper, darker, irrational (and even unconscious) forces, forces that erupt into the human consciousness and into society, bringing in their train both peril and opportunity. It would be wrong, however, to suppose that these movements present wholly new emphases. In general, they may be characterized as a continuation of the voluntarist tradition

of American and European thought which reaches back through Dewey, James, Peirce, Marx, Schopenhauer, Schelling, Kant, Boehme, and Luther, to Duns Scotus. Indeed, one can trace the line on back through Augustine to the Bible and to early Greek philosophy.

Professor Aubrey of the Divinity School in The University of Chicago has recently published a book¹ which may be taken as representative of this tendency to supplement the rationalist approach. This book provides stimulating insights concerning the nature of human nature, insights drawn from a fresh consideration of both contemporary social science and historic Christian theology. Of special interest is Professor Aubrey's discussion of the inadequacies of the old rationalistic liberalism. He holds that "personality is grounded in something which is deeper than reason can penetrate or concepts communicate, which foundation has cosmic status and antedated the emergence of human society." He goes on to say that "such a substructure need not be anti-rational; and, indeed, so far as rational communication can and does enrich community, such a substratum must be congenial to reason." The upshot of this emphasis is that "man in search of himself" will surely go astray unless he recognizes that "the thinking person is much broader than the impoverished 'rational man' of the Enlightenment."

It is precisely to a consideration of these questions that the articles in this issue of *THE JOURNAL* are devoted. Professor Beth suggests some of the ways in which Depth Psychology has illumined the deep, pregnant recesses of the human psyche. Professor Merton in his finely critical article shows how Mannheim and others have brought to light the social sources of irrationality and how Mannheim would remedy the situation. And Mr. Shils indicates, in well-chosen material from Mannheim's rich store, how the latter would (in line with the leading ideas of the Enlightenment) save human freedom in the face of the irrational forces that operate today in democratic society, a society that is rapidly developing into a mass democracy and at the same time is increasingly excluding large sections of the population from vital participation in a meaningful communal life—tendencies that release eruptive irrational forces of stubborn reaction, vulgarization, utopianism, and revolution.

¹MAN'S SEARCH FOR HIMSELF. By Edwin Ewart Aubrey. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1940. 222 pp. \$1.75.

Now, what are the implications of these ideas for the liberal conception of man? The answer to this question is one of the central needs of our generation, and it will require more than a generation to find it. Nevertheless, it may be well for us to attempt a brief statement of the principal considerations relevant for the new liberal doctrine of man. Certain of these items could, of course, be stated in theological terms, (indeed, this also is a pressing need—a need to which Professor Aubrey has addressed himself), but at the moment we shall restrict ourselves mainly to the language of social psychology.

1. Human nature (and with it existence in general) must be interpreted dialectically: Man possesses a fundamental contradiction in his nature: he is conditioned by inner and outer non-rational forces, and yet through the exercise of freedom he may in some measure transcend this conditioning. The old liberalism in its basically non-tragical view of life had a very attenuated awareness of the power of the non-rational and the irrational elements in life and thus also a feeble sense of both the full resources for and the obstacles to the achievement of freedom. Both Mannheim and Freud have sensitized our awareness in these areas. Especially significant is Mannheim's recent attempt to develop a sociology of knowledge. The presupposition of this attempt is the belief that man can achieve meaningful freedom only by detecting the ways in which he and his fellows are biased through social conditioning and interest, and by transcending these "situation-bound tendencies." Hence, the Freudian concept of "rationalization" and the Marxian concept of ideology as refined by Mannheim (a conception long ago set forth in Luther's idea of the "man-made God"), must be employed as constant correctives for (bourgeois or proletarian) complacency and self-absolutization. Yet, these correctives should not be allowed to destroy the courageous dynamic of what Mannheim calls "utopian" (i.e. progressive) action. Faith in the possibility of achieving human fulfillment and community must be maintained. This leads us to a consideration of the means of fulfillment.

2. The bonds of society are non-rational and imaginative as well as rational, unconscious as well as conscious. The old liberalism attached too great a significance, indeed, it laid too great a burden upon, the rational and conscious intellectual life. Man's whole nature and his profoundest loyalties can be expressed only

in imaginative, emotive symbols that will release and give direction to the deepest tensions of the human psyche and of society at large. The atomization of our society and the social distances that we now suffer from can only be overcome by means of (rationally criticized, but) deeply affective institutional patterns that bring men together into creative community. (This, of course, raises the whole problem of leadership, a problem which Mannheim relates to the question of the nature and function of the élites who "manipulate" the symbols.) The atomization of our society is due not only to the perennial combativeness of man, but also to the increasingly rigid stratification of society into widely separated classes and specializations. This consideration leads us to an aspect of the doctrine of man which has to do with the particular historical situation in which modern man finds himself.

3. The irrational element in human nature manifests itself largely in accordance with the pressures and needs peculiar to a given society or historical situation. One main source of the irrationality of human behavior in our day is the oppression and frustration that issue from concentration of power (and the consequent prostitution of the élites) and from the exclusion of the average man from voluntary and meaningful participation in the activities appropriate to a free society. The older liberal doctrine of man was egregiously deficient in so far as its theory of freedom viewed the individual as an atomic datum, choosing his goals quite freely and setting out to achieve them. As Eduard Lindeman has pointed out, freedom involves not only freedom from coercion but also "freedom with," freedom to participate in a common institutional life which provides criticism, guidance, and group support. Men who are not able or are not permitted to make decisions concerning the basic values and ends of life become less than men and resort to irrational and destructive expedients and expediencies. Freedom presupposes the will to be free, a tolerable minimum of economic security, and dynamic social purpose and responsibility. People who have lost these things very readily surrender their freedom to a "leader." They set up "substitute goals," such as military glory, racial pride, class pride, escapist eroticism, and ecstatic utopianism.

Thus, no doctrine of man that purports to analyze human behavior or recommend suitable action is adequate that does not take into account the effect which the particular structure (the *principia*

media) of society at a given period has upon its constituents. This statement has two major implications. First, the ways in which human nature will act at a given moment are not to be attributed solely either to man's original virtue or his original sin. The tensions set up by the general social and spiritual situation largely determine how much of the beast, how much of the automaton, and how much of the divine spark in man shall find expression. Secondly (and consequently), merely general pronouncements concerning human virtue or brotherly love will do little to relieve tensions and resolve conflict. To be sure, accidental human wants must not be uncritically accepted as final and adequate. That is, ultimate value postulates and loyalty to them are indispensable. But they can be implemented only if we learn how to apply them to the unique historical situation in which we find ourselves. Without explicit knowledge of the conditions under which meaningful social changes take place, these values will have little opportunity for expression, except through some inner "spiritual" opium-eating or through a privileged and splendid isolation.

This means that any adequate doctrine of man today must include an orientation to the future, different from that of the old liberalism. What Mannheim and thinkers like him suggest is, that we are now passing from the old form of *laissez-faire*, semi-democratic, "individualist" society to a society that will be economically highly developed and that will be politically an *organized* mass democracy. In this new society, a long-term and large-scale planning will be necessary. The present world crisis must be interpreted as the prelude either to a totalitarianism that will crush all individual freedom or to a new kind of society in which the enclaves of freedom will be planned and brought into being in the teeth of an irrationalism that is equally destructive in its tendency, whether it come from the conservatives or from the revolt of the masses. If we cannot combine democratic planning and democratic freedom, then both will go. Thus, the old *laissez-faire* individualism must be viewed as a transitional phase between a medieval feudal structure of society and a new planned society. Whether that new society will be free or totalitarian will be determined by the strength or weakness of the liberal faith in man and in the creative depths of the cosmos itself.

The Contribution of Freud's and Jung's Depth Psychology to the Understanding of the Christian Message¹

KARL BETH

I

Depth Psychology has made a real contribution to the understanding of the Christian message. This contribution, however, is not to be found in Freud's or Jung's direct attempts to deal with religion. For whatever either of them tries to say on religion itself is of no positive value in respect to practical religious life. Neither what Freud says concerning the origin of religion in primitive conciliatory exercises directed toward the ghost of the primordial father, nor what Jung tells us about the symbols in dreams being the same intuitive images that have been effective in religion, appears to us of any importance for the religious question. More than that: both these views seem to us wrong at the very outset. On the other hand, certain observations on human mental life in general have been offered by this psychology, which cannot remain without influence upon research into the substance of Christianity. To these the religious scholar should draw more attention than was usual before Freud. What psychoanalysis has to offer to the religious scholar as well as to the practicing clergyman, I shall try to sum up in two sections, covering the following points:

(1) Two observations through which psychoanalysis touches the religious problem in itself and makes a place for certain Christian attitudes, and

(2) the acknowledgement of the important role that the unconscious actually plays in the religious life, and thus the insistence upon the fact that the unconscious processes ought to be observed, considered, and allowed for to a much larger extent than has been done hitherto.

II

The first point that I have to mention is the one most frequently considered in theological discussions. It is one of the two single

¹The ensuing article is part of an address delivered as the Earl Lecture at the Pacific School of Religion in Berkeley, California, on February 22, 1940.

ideas in psychoanalytic theory which under certain circumstances, and in some cases, may contribute to the conception of the Christian message. I refer to Freud's idea of Censorship.

Freud discovered that a neurosis "originates in repressed infantile sexuality." For this reason Freud appeals to the analogy of the supposed condition of the first parents' first sons who were censored by none other than the ghost of the father whom they had killed. Every censor that makes its appearance during the course of mankind's development is thus to be regarded as a transformed father-ghost, which Freud wrongly calls a Totem. In this way Freud explains the nature of conscience. Then in the little book, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) which was written on the basis of his clinical experience with the war-wounded, he shows that the double polarity of the psyche functions in such a way as to complete the one-sided longings inspired by the pleasure-principle. Here the opposite pole to the pleasure-principle is the reality-principle. This principle represents to the individual the necessity of avoiding a pleasure which may in the end involve a greater pain. In his day-dreams and in his unconscious, man obeys the pleasure-principle, but his insight into consequences shows him how perilous that is. Here, then, also the usual interpretation of psychic activity stresses the role of intellectual decision.

Freud, however, is not inclined to believe the conscience to be a conscious function,—and he may be right in this point. But it would have been sufficient for him to argue that rational reflection is not the sole nor the proper cause of the most profound element in the psyche. Such a concession would not have conspired against his search for a more deep-rooted layer. Without making such a concession he now finds that it is the Ego that produces both repression and resistance; and in this Ego there is only one conscious side, namely, the relation to environment or the fact that the individual is aware of unpleasantness and pain, which proves that the Ego is conscious. This view that the Ego has a conscious aspect is obviously inconsistent with the view that the conscience is unconscious. Yet, we must not forget that it is only the surface of the psyche that is in contact with the environment, whereas the interior makes no such contacts. This interior is called by Freud the Id (or It). This Id includes the constructive and destructive forces in life, life-and-death instincts. The Id follows the pleasure-principle, and the Ego makes the Id acquainted

with the reality-principle. Thus we may say that the Ego is the censor. However, there is also a third factor, the Super-Ego or the Ego-ideal which corresponds more directly to what we call conscience.

Theologically considered, this result means that the analytical digging into the fundamentals of the driving forces of human life has brought the inaugurator of this method to acknowledge the existence of the same impulses as those that are in the Christian religion called *repentance and atonement*.

Another point at which psychoanalysis touches on the religious problem has to do with one of the main trends among our youth today, their tendency to interpret life *collectivistically* and to abandon the *individualistic* point of view. Psychoanalysis has provided us with a key by which the door into the realm of the individual soul opens. To be sure, there have been great epochs of individualistic tendencies in science before. We may recall, for instance, the appreciation of the individual by thinkers of the Renaissance (Pico, Petrarch, and others), of the Reformation and the Enlightenment, and by Schleiermacher particularly. In our time many people seem to feel that individualism has had its day. But Freud, in his clinical practice, made the individual person the object of his analysis. He thereby began a new era in the study of the *valuation of the individual*.

To state this today seems to me very important because our youth appear to be increasingly under the influence of a contrary principle and to be prone to look upon themselves as entirely conditioned by the whole or the mass. They put their trust in the collectivistic method of a certain speculative science which has done all it could to promote a view that over stresses a collectivistic dependence and the purely social conditioning of the individual, but this method stops short just before entering the field of self-consciousness. The fact that the method stops short in this fashion shows the insufficiency of merely collectivistic methods to deal with the greatest problem of man; it clearly reveals that the problems of man cannot be solved on the level of collective life. It is today as it was once in Greece when, to the Sophists' theory that man is the measure of all things, Socrates gave the world-conquering individualistic answer: Know thyself! And it is just this self-knowledge that, whether or not they are successful, psychoanalysts attempt to provide for the individuals in their clinics. Freud started

from the insight that each individual has his own problems, because he has his own character and development. Freud was in this way one of the first conquerors of the realm of the individual in our time. In his wholly individualistic method of inquiry he has bestowed on the individual for ages to come the means of devoting himself to his own plans, resolutions, visions, opinions, as distinguished from the tendencies and functions of the average mind: and thus Freud has helped the modern man to detect the reality of what is in his own soul.

Although Freud, like most scholars in their particular fields, formulated a scheme of stereotyped cases, he did at least in the beginning of his investigations treat each case as a special discovery. This is what those who now worship Freud and his ideas should keep in mind. *Freud never admitted that the individual is determined by society*, that he is robbed of free will by his surroundings. On the contrary, Freud regarded every individual as fighting the rules imposed by society. He admitted, to be sure, that each person brings with him, and receives too, a not inconsiderable endowment from society. But he would never have extended *the principle of conditionedness* to the point of asserting that man is totally conditioned by environment. Psychoanalysis is directly opposed to the collectivistic principle because of the important role given to the Ego and the Super-Ego which are individually variant.

We must not forget that Freud was guided toward this end from his very outset in the French (Nancy) School of Charcot (and others), to treat each person in a way adapted specifically to him or her; that school repudiated mass treatment: the individual delinquent as well as the normal person has to be regarded as the helpless prisoner of unconscious complexes which he does not understand. As far as the Christian message is a message about the independent soul, it finds reinforcement in the psychoanalytic theory. And the youth of this age must come to realize this analytic point of view!

III

We now turn to the second aspect of our subject and consider what psychoanalysis has to offer to the student of religion, namely, it calls attention to *the role of the unconscious* in the religious life. Freud directs attention to the role of the unconscious as it develops from the continuous transformation of the conscious experiences

of the early years of childhood. This view of Freud's naturally raises the question as to whether we should make a radical separation between pre-natal and childhood experience. Rudolf Steiner, the founder and leader of the Anthroposophic Society in Germany and Switzerland, asserted that he could recall experiences before his birth. Why should not this embryonic phase of experience be subjected to further scientific investigation? Indeed, a move in this direction has been made by the American psychologist Trigant Burrow who, in his ingeniously written work *The Biology of Human Conflict*, has explored the evolution of those hidden unconscious regions during the embryonic months, the period called by him the phase of undifferentiated, total, stereognostic experience, the miraculous phase of an extra-sensory experience of the developing individual. Regrettably, I must limit myself to the mere mention of this recent work of research, though it deserves a more extended consideration.

We must now devote our attention to the work of Carl Gustav Jung, who with his idea of the *Collective Unconscious* tries to reach deeper than Freud into the mental development of the *human race*. The collectivist point of view implicit in this conception is, as a matter of course, not consonant with the individualistic outlook which we found in Freud. Jung, by clinging to this theory of his, seems to have been seduced into subsuming the experiences of all and sundry individuals under one lowest common denominator. This becomes quite evident in his device for the interpretation of dreams. Even though we do not share any of his explanations of dreams, we cannot ignore the main trend of his thought. He compels us, for example, to recognize the significance of the symbols chosen by him to interpret the particular elements of various kinds of dreams. The dreamer himself—so Jung thinks—suggests these symbols, and particularly the symbol of the unconscious. Unconsciously the dreamer thinks or feels, when dreaming of the Sea, of the collective unconscious as a whole, "because it hides unsuspected depths under a reflecting surface." And the persons whom the dreamer sees behind him in the dream are "companions who have broken like a flood into the *terra firma* of consciousness," "irrational and inexplicable to the individual," signifying a "momentous alteration of the personality."

What strange sort of psychic evolution has here taken place? We see only the result of this evolution: It "is as a rule a vivifying

of the psychic atmosphere as a substitute for the lost contact with the individual's fellow beings." Thus there appears "something similar to the illusions and hallucinations of lonely desert travellers, seafarers and saints. The mechanism of this manifestation can be explained in terms of energy." Hence, the substitute, created by the vivifying of the withered psychic content or atmosphere of the insular individual, is a world of dreams and spectres.

Now, religion may in certain respects be compared with such an automatically mechanized substitute for psychic life and activity. "Thus it comes about that lonely, desert places are always inhabited for primitive man by devils and similar spectres."

Jung traces the field of the unconscious, in which the great ideas and idealisms are rooted, much farther back than either Freud or even Burrow does, far beyond every individual's past—that is, even back into pre-history. From the earliest phases of mankind Jung sees a red thread, to which all ideas and systems of ideas are attached; that is to say, he envisages a universal human character unaltered through all the generations—the *Archaic man* or the *Archetype*.

No doubt Jung here touches upon something very important for the describing of the essential processes of the spiritual life. The exponents of the various theories of religious experience are always in some embarrassment when obliged to find an inward anchoring place for that experience. If the Archetype could be shown to represent an actual element in mental development, it would offer an admirable device for elucidating the problem of inner experience. Indeed, in this connection Jung speaks about the nature of those intuitive processes that are not directed by the rational mind, of which religious experience is an example. Here Jung asserts the reality of certain mental processes characterized by a relative absence of, or better, by a limited use of the rational functions of the mind, in favor of other functions. These processes include perceptions not given in the rational, externally mediated activity of consciousness. And religious experience is of this sort, though it is also much more than this, because it is bound to a totally different dimension. Here we find, then, a possible basis for venturing a scientific explanation of the fact that the religious person is led by his experience into quite another realm of being and existence.

It should be observed that we call only that experience religious which takes us beyond the experiences of daily life. I am inclined

to add: There is no religious experience without some *coup mystique*, that is, without a sort of mystic woof bound up with the warp of everyday experience, the two together forming the tissue of the world-vision.

But this experience depends on a *propensity to transcend* the sensory order. And there is in the religions of the world a common consent that this tendency presupposes something like Socratic self-knowledge, the recognition of the true self. I think that Jesus shared this presupposition when he focused his hearers' attention on the one point necessary, namely to be ready to lose their own selves. This demand is the core of Jesus' message.

In these words Jesus refers to the need of an *inward conflict* in the human person. Man not only is but must be divided in himself. This agrees with the assertion of Depth Psychology that it belongs to man's nature to go through a certain conflict. Although Jesus, when speaking of that inner conflict, mostly to simple people, could not use learned terms, we may give a psychological explanation, even though it be no more than to indicate that man is not a unity. Or, to use the terminology coined by William Stern in his "psychology of personality," we may assert that man as a person is a *Unitas multiplex*—a multiple unity. This is a paradox signifying that man is a being that is in continuous conflict with himself.

This thesis, which bears a close relation to both the conviction of the fact of sin and the necessity of conversion in Christianity, has been unmercifully brought to light by Depth Psychology, and it belongs among its greatest contributions to the practical psychology of the minister. Depth Psychology on the basis of its research concerning the border-line between the conscious and the unconscious, has more than any other school unflinchingly stressed that there are two natures in every man's soul. This is a true description of man, because his common nature is an accommodation to the mass, to the average, while his properly personal nature is generally concealed behind the other nature. Man in his very nature—so far as he has himself formed it—wears a mask before all others, even before himself. Depth Psychology, by compelling man to recognize what he had never before known to exist within him, has revealed to him the two sides of his nature, the one which is openly manifest and the other which is hidden. The owner of these two selves does not know about their existence, does not even know that he is playing a double part, until Depth Psychology

makes him aware of this fact and teaches him to observe this duality of the human being in his conversation with other people. It is obvious that the revelation of a fact of such tremendous influence upon the personal attitude, is of greatest importance for the fashioning of the Christian personality.

This binary factor, which is not in the consciousness but rather outside of the conscious region, exhibits its role in a radical way in a normal person who, excited by strong emotion, is passing through an alteration of mood. You catch a man in such a mood, and find him to be a different person from the one you knew before, and yet he is not schizoid. He is doing something he would never do unless he were in such a mood, and he is doing what you never saw him do before. Though of a thoroughly peaceful disposition, he may show almost the traits of a murderer. No psychologist is astonished by this "contradiction" in one person. Thus our vision is sharpened so that we may observe this "contradiction" even in the quite regular course of man's life. We observe that in everybody there is the possibility of giving way to an uncommon manner of behavior and reaction alongside his ordinary behavior. Mythologically expressed, every man has his demon or devil,—even the saint has his.

However, this "other side" need not be demonic. It would be nearer the truth to say that the word demonic comes nearer describing the spirit of the man that is perfectly adjusted to the average opinion. All of us are accustomed to hide our real thoughts. But so long as we do not realize this fact and thus claim to be free of its influence, so long are we masking ourselves before our own eyes. We mask our soul as if it were an undetectable inmost treasure, often hiding even our tender and friendly feelings, being as it were ashamed of the existence of a soul; openly showing the worst side of our character, our character as it is adjusted to a low common attitude: we are shy to confess that there is something good in us. Thus our talk may conceal our Better Self which is constantly suppressed in our conventional intercourse. But this hidden side of man contains his real Fate, his Destiny, his true spiritual goal.

This truth has been expressed, in terms of neuropathology by saying that everybody is his own foe, and is also schizoid. We are our own enemies until we become aware of the fact that we are

not honest with ourselves. Here we have isolated one of our cardinal sins.

IV

When employing this new theory of the unconscious for the better understanding of the Christian message, we must first, in order not to roam too far afield, limit our interpretation of the Christian message to the Protestant conception of it. Protestantism is not a doctrine, not a system of beliefs, nor is it to be described as a dogma or a sum of dogmas. Protestantism signifies a certain "guiding tendency of life" (*Lebensleitlinie*). Yet, this "guiding tendency of life" is not simply a scheme that can be mechanically used to correct a wrong life. Protestantism is something organic throughout. It is a *structure of religious attitude* by means of which a person's life obtains a distinct and guiding tendency. And this tendency is movable, oscillating in itself, because it is a dynamic energy.

It is not strange that in our time this characteristic has received little attention. If you make a survey of the history of Protestantism, you will quickly see that this principle has never ruled in any large groups, not even in the first age of this movement. This circumstance has led to the result that there has never been an actual Protestant course in history; this course is to come in some future day. So far there have been only two great philosophers in the birth-country of the Reformation who were really inspired by that principle, and even they could not carry it through. They were Eduard von Hartmann and Wilhelm Dilthey. They laid stress upon the sort of religious attitude that is kindled and determined only in the inmost part of the personality. Hence they travelled both theoretically and metaphysically along the path that led through the region of the unconscious, choosing the inmost soul as the subject of their study.

Hartmann published his famous work *The Philosophy of the Unconscious* in 1869. A little later Dilthey from a different approach took issue with the philosophy of pure consciousness, though he did not specifically espouse a philosophy of the unconscious. Until their time you will seek in vain for a Protestant thinker who will provide a basic principle for an essentially "evangelical" outlook. For, in all the history of Protestant thought the Protestant principle has never been clearly expressed or consis-

tently carried through. In the sixteenth century the great mistake was made of fighting the Roman Catholic system on the battleground of Roman scholastic thought, that is, with the weapons of the conscious intellect. Thus the Protestant thinkers and spiritual leaders of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries formed their systems of Protestant doctrine and apologetics by appropriating the intellectual arsenal of their enemies—weapons in no way adaptable to their quite different manner of visualizing the religious question—rather than by forging their own set of weapons. This meant that they continued arguing matters of faith and religious conduct with the instruments of conscious argumentation and conscious deliberation, as though the contents of belief were mirrored in the human intellect.

The fundamental error of this intellectualism had already been detected in the age previous to the Reformation. The clear-sighted thinkers of the Renaissance, feeling unable to find the core of Christianity by means of the Aristotelian logic and categories, had introduced a new-old line of philosophy by revivifying Platonism, toward the end of devising a new way of expressing Christian truth. But the Protestant leaders in the sixteenth century—except for the circle around Zwingli—had forgotten or never realized for what reason a Ficino, for instance, had chosen Platonic mysticism to serve as a framework for the Christian conception of his age in terms of a universalistic and theistic faith. It is regrettable that the Protestant schools did not follow Renaissance thought, that they did not know that this way of viewing the Christian message was born out of a very great spiritual distress and gave its originators a means of recourse to the deep waters of the unconscious well of Christian thought. On the contrary, Protestantism employed only the intellectual system of categories. Hence, already in the seventeenth century the way was prepared for the later and unfortunate over-intellectualization of the Christian attitude.

Thus the very strange fact became evident, that the combat against intellectual dogmatism was to be fought mostly by means of the intellect, it was to be carried out by the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, and thus would be unable to reach the goal it was destined for: a strengthening of the inward religious forces of the soul. The man of consciousness became the controller of all spiritual life. This was the more perilous since Protestantism did not possess a balancing power such as Catholicism had in its mystic

groups. Thus, the worse coming to the worst, Protestantism completely failed to carry its cause through on its own principle, with the result that in the end that principle was actually forgotten. Luther was on the right road when he emphasized the principle of the inwardness of belief and of religious conviction. For he had realized that religious conviction is not rooted in the consciousness. This conviction he expressed in the assertion of the *inward testimony of the Holy Spirit*, a testimony of religious experience as true without any external documents, but true merely from the truth inwardly revealed. In this way Luther gave a decisive importance, even in the Christian life, to the unconscious. The outer world of consciousness is then of no value for the development of the inner life.

V

Let us now consider more in detail the significance of the unconscious for the structure of Protestant Christianity. It is the very pivot on which the door of a consistent development of Protestantism in the future has to turn. In Protestantism religion is no longer a configuration of the surface of the mind, nor a product of the intellect alone. It is as it were a bubbling and effervescing on the ground of the mental abyss, like Meister Eckhart's "little spark" in the soul-ground. Depth Psychology provides us with the psychological resources for the working out of the Protestant conception of religion, the religion of the confessed and acknowledged tension in the unconscious.

It would require more than the space of an article to show the position or place of the unconscious in the perspective of the universe as well as in human existence. I shall here mention only two points of view in order to put this matter into a more generally scientific light.

Jung chose the expression "the Archetype" to describe something residing as it were in the archaic part of man, a most ancient residue which comes, and must come more than it did before, to activity, revivifying powers out of the dark backward and abyssm of time. Critics of the kind that are always fighting excellent ideas which they are too moribund to create, have scorned these archetypes as being mythical figures only. I think that there is something more of reality in those figures which are born out of the reservoir of long ages of mankind. Just because they were first

expressed in mythical terms—which so often not only were but still are the sole vehicle of our brain and language—expressing certain important truths in the transcendent dimension, I find in them some reality.

Let us make a comparison. Nobody doubts today (though he did perhaps some years ago!) that certain bacteria may survive temperatures unbearable for all other creatures. Liquid helium has been obtained at a temperature of 272 degrees Centigrade below zero (or 450 degrees Fahrenheit below zero). We used to assume that bacteria put into such a cold temperature would die. But now we know that they start a new life as soon as helium enters a new process. The congealed germs warmed up come to their living function again. Could not some "psychogerm" or "psychospore" preserved from a very ancient past, come to life again after its long voyage through generations of mental life? But it cannot come to life and activity again except as an unconscious psychic element out of a huge reservoir of universally reserved psychogermes.

The reality of these "germs" has been sensed already by peoples who have lived spiritually on mythical configurations, when they have longed for contact with the pregnant realm of "The Mothers"—the great storehouse of deep, unconscious creative forces. These forces contain the depth-unlocking keys the Protestant man is looking for, though to be sure he searches for them unconsciously in most cases, in order to achieve temporary security and the alleviation of his tensions. Goethe presented this Protestant man in the figure of the post-medieval Faust who after all his disappointing attempts in intellectual science and magic turned in repentance to the realm of "The Mothers"; descending to the primordial sources of all life beyond consciousness in order to receive the inspiration for correct motivation and judgment.

"The Mothers" were adored in many an ancient religion, because in those remote times there were spiritual leaders who knew of the source of all real truth, by which a person must be imbued in order not to lose connection with the springs of reality. Thus the Greeks plunged into the realm of "The Mothers" in those mysteries devoted to Demeter, Dionysos or Orpheus; or they adopted from the Phrygians the cult of the Magna Mater Kybele. Thus the Egyptians descended with confidence to Isis and Nephtys, and the Babylonians in complicated ceremonies descended

into the darkness—the enlightening darkness—of Ishtar; and so likewise in analogous ways with the ancient Germans and Celts. The Protestant man holds that the connection with the beyond called revelation has not been lost nor was it given to only a few nations in ages of old, but that it remains constantly accessible and is to be approached only through experiences arising out of the unconscious. Roots of the soul life are struck down into this realm in order to find there a new spiritual nourishment.

I might compare the discovery of the unconscious, as applied to understanding modern man, to the discovery of the non-Euclidean geometry. What an immense outlook of new possibilities there is in the non-Euclidean world! Almost infinite are the new paths of parallels to be drawn through a single point in the non-Euclidean world, while the Euclidean geometry allows no more than one line to be drawn. The unconscious actually opens a new world of mental and spiritual opportunities worthy to be dealt with by the psychology of religion. The human mind's approach to realities beyond sensory awareness cannot be achieved by the intellect and consciousness alone. This fact itself gives rise to the strongest of all tensions.

Dynamic religion always operates with tensions; and hence the Protestant religion operates in this way. Now, religious tension is, as a rule, regarded as something conscious. This is the result of the intellectualist emphasis in the history of religious thought already mentioned. As a matter of fact, however, there are only a few religious tensions that belong to the circuit of conscious mental factors; most religious tensions are unconscious processes. They make their appearance as movements of unrest, of which man does not know the reason. Just this disquietude gives him that dynamic element in his nature that he—the religious man, or let us say again, the Protestant man—likes to hold to as the constant stimulus to acting, searching, and questioning, with regard to his own religious experiences.

Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Knowledge

ROBERT K. MERTON

*But indeed language has succeeded until recently in
hiding from us almost all the things we talk about.*

—I. A. Richards

The discipline which its German exponents have called *Wissenssoziologie*—and failing a simpler English term, the turgid Teutonicism is best retained—has a long pre-history, centered largely about the problem of objectivity of knowledge.¹ *Systematic* consideration of the social factors in the acquisition, diffusion and growth of knowledge, however, is a relatively late development which has its two main roots in French and German sociological thought.² The two lines of development had different antecedents and characteristically different emphases in the choice of problems. The French, Durkheimian branch derived primarily from an ethnographical background which stressed the range of variation among different peoples of not only moral and social structure but also cognitive orientations. The pioneering Durkheim himself, in well-known passages in his *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (Paris, 1912), presented an audacious analysis of the social origins of the fundamental categories of thought. Departing in some respects from Durkheim, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, in his studies of primitive mentality, sought to demonstrate irreducible differences between primitive and civilized mentalities. Other followers of Durkheim have broken through this primary concern with preliterates and have applied his conceptual scheme to various social aspects of thought and knowledge in civilized society. These studies testify that the French contributions to

¹Of this pre-history, little can be said in a brief paper. A sketch of this early development, at least from the so-called Era of Enlightenment, is provided in Ernst Grünwald, *Das Problem der Soziologie des Wissens* (Wien-Leipzig, 1934), chapter I. It is not mere antiquarianism to suggest, however, that this pre-history can be dated from the time of the Greek Enlightenment. Indeed, Pierre-Maxime Schuhl's exemplary *Essai sur la formation de la pensée grecque* (Paris, 1934) is ample basis for suggesting an earlier, if equally arbitrary, 'beginning'.

²One may cavil at this observation by citing suggestive *aperçus* in English thought from at least the time of Francis Bacon and Hobbes. Likewise, the pragmatic movement from Peirce and James onward is informed with relevant discussions. However, these did not constitute systematic analyses of the central *sociological* problems in question. An exhaustive treatment of this field would of course include these tangential developments.

la sociologie du savoir are largely autochthonous and independent of similar researches in Germany.⁸

The main German antecedents of Wissenssoziologie are found among the immediate precursors of Mannheim. They were by no means of a piece—indeed, they often supported antithetical views but they were largely concerned with the same body of problems. Moreover, in unravelling the intellectual ancestry of Mannheim it cannot be supposed that he followed in all relevant respects the lead of any of these. On the contrary, he joined issue with all of them in one connexion or another and it was precisely these *Auseinandersetzungen* which repeatedly led him to clarify his own position.

Left-wing Hegelianism and Marx in particular have above all others left their impress on Mannheim's work. His position has, in fact, been characterized as "bourgeois Marxism." In Marx and Engels, and in Georg Lukács' stimulating *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*, we find some of Mannheim's basic conceptions: the far-reaching historicism which sees even the categorical apparatus as a function of the social, and particularly the class, structure;^{9a} the dynamic conception of knowledge;^{9b} the activist inter-

⁸Not wholly, however, for Durkheim initiated a section in *L'Année sociologique* (XI, 1910, p. 41) on "conditions sociologiques de la connaissance" on the occasion of a review of Wilhelm Jerusalem's article, "Die Soziologie des Erkennens." Again, brief bibliographical indications must be substituted for a detailed discussion of the Durkheim tradition. Maurice Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (Paris, 1925), develops the thesis that memory, the epistemological relevance of which has been lately stressed by Schlick, Frank and others of the Vienna circle, is a function of the social framework. Marcel Granet, in *La civilisation chinoise* (Paris, 1929) and particularly in his widely-heralded *La pensée chinoise* (Paris, 1934), attributes characteristically Chinese modes of thought to various features of the social structure. Durkheim also influenced various writers on the beginnings of Occidental science: Abel Rey, *La science orientale avant les Grecs* (Paris, 1930), *La jeunesse de la science grecque* (Paris, 1933); Léon Robin, *La pensée grecque et les origines de l'esprit scientifique* (Paris, 1928); P-M. Schuhl, *op. cit.*, and to some extent, Arnold Reymond, *Histoire des sciences exactes et naturelles dans l'antiquité gréco-romaine* (Paris, 1924). His influence is also manifest in various sociological studies of art and literature, preeminently those by Charles Lalo. In this connexion, see volumes 16 and 17 of the *Encyclopédie française*, entitled "Arts et littératures dans la société contemporaine" (Paris, 1935-6). The one noteworthy contributor to Wissenssoziologie in France who antedated Durkheim and who stemmed from a quasi-Marxist heritage was Georges Sorel. See his *Le procès de Socrate* (Paris, 1889); *Réflexions sur la violence* (Paris, 1908); *Les illusions du progrès* (Paris, 1908).

^{9a}E.g., Friedrich Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," in *Karl Marx: Selected Works* (Moscow, 1935), I, p. 142 f; cf. *Die deutsche Ideologie, Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* (Berlin, 1931), V.

^{9b}Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy," *ibid.*, I, p. 453 f.

pretation of the dialectic relations between theory and practice;^{4c} the role of knowledge in shifting human action from the realm of "necessity" to that of "freedom";^{4d} the place of contradictions and conflicting social groups in initiating reflexion;^{4e} the emphasis on concrete sociology as distinct from the imputation of historically-determined qualities to the abstract individual.^{4f}

The neo-Kantians, particularly the so-called Southwest or Baden school—the use of a single rubric for this group of theorists should not obscure their differences attested by numerous disagreements on specific points—likewise contributed to the formation of Mannheim's views. In fact, as we shall see, Mannheim departed less from their central theses than he seems to have realized.⁵ From Dilthey, Rickert, Troeltsch and especially Max Weber, he derived much that is fundamental to his thought: the emphasis on affective-volitional elements in the direction and formation of thought; a dualism, explicitly repudiated by Mannheim yet persisting in numerous formulations, in the theory of knowledge which draws a distinction between the role of value-elements in the development of the "exact sciences" and *Geisteswissenschaften*; the distinction between *Erkennen* and *Erklären* on the one hand and *Erleben* and *Verstehen* on the other; value-relevance of thought as not involving a fundamental invalidity of empirical judgments.⁶ Finally, from the writings of the phenomenologists, Husserl, Jaspers, Heidegger and above all Max Scheler, Mannheim probably derived an emphasis on the accurate observation of facts 'given' in direct experience; a concern with the analysis of *Selbstverständlichkeiten* in social life; relating various types of intel-

^{4c}Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," *ibid.*, I, 471; *cf.* *Capital* (Chicago, 1925-6), III, p. 954.

^{4d}Engels, "Socialism . . .", *op. cit.*, I, pp. 180-1.

^{4e}Marx, "Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy," *ibid.*, I, p. 356.

^{4f}Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," *op. cit.*, I, p. 473.

⁵In his essay on "Das Problem einer Soziologie des Wissens," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik*, LIV (1925), p. 599 f., Mannheim explicitly repudiates neo-Kantianism as a point of departure for Wissenssoziologie. But see our later discussion in which it is maintained that *in practice*, Mannheim approaches the Rickert-Weber concept of *Wertbeziehung* very closely indeed.

⁶See Heinrich Rickert, *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, 4th ed. (Tübingen, 1921), esp. pp. 35-51, 245-271; Wilhelm Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Leipzig, 1923-33) esp. VII, pp. 205-300; Ernst Troeltsch, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Tübingen, 1922), III, p. 68 f., 169 ff.; Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen, 1922), pp. 146-214; 403-502.

lectual cooperation to types of group structure.⁷ Mannheim's varied background is reflected in his eclecticism and in a fundamental instability in his conceptual framework.

It must at once be noted that Mannheim's theories have been undergoing constant change so that one cannot with propriety deal with his earlier or later studies as equally representing his matured views.⁸ Since it is not the object of this paper to trace the development of Mannheim's thought, although such an enterprise might well reward the student of Wissenssoziologie, we shall take his more recent works as a key to his present position and refer to the earlier writings only when they throw additional light on this position. This does not, of course, imply the general proposition that later formulations are invariably more accurate and pro-

⁷See Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (New York, 1931), pp. 187 ff.; Karl Jaspers, *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (Berlin, 1925), pp. 20 ff.; 142 ff.; Julius Kraft, *Von Husserl zu Heidegger* (Leipzig, 1932), esp. p. 87 ff.; Max Scheler, *Versuche einer Soziologie des Wissens* (Munich-Leipzig, 1924); *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* (Leipzig, 1926).

⁸Cf. Grünwald, *op. cit.*, pp. 266-7. In order to abbreviate subsequent references and to distinguish between Mannheim's 'early' and 'later' periods, the following alphabetical citations will be used throughout. Inasmuch as the article, "Wissenssoziologie" represents Mannheim's first radical departure from his previous position, this will be taken to mark the emergence of his 'new formulations.'

- A. 1923. "Der Historismus," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, LII, pp. 1-60.
- B. 1925. "Das Problem einer Soziologie des Wissens," *ibid.*, LIII, pp. 577-652.
- C. 1926. "Ideologische und soziologische Interpretation der geistigen Gebilde," *Jahrbuch für Soziologie* (Karlsruhe), II, pp. 424-40.
- D. 1927. "Das konservative Denken," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*, LVII, Heft 1-2, pp. 68-142.
- E. 1928. "Das Problem der Generationen," *Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie*, VII, pp. 157-185.
- F. 1929. "Die Bedeutung der Konkurrenz im Gebiete des Geistigen," *Verhandlungen des 6. deutschen Soziologentages in Zürich* (Tübingen), pp. 35-83.
- G. 1929. *Ideologie und Utopie* (Bonn) trans. by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils as parts II-IV (pp. 49-236) of *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1936). References are to the English edition.
- H. 1931. "Wissenssoziologie," *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie*, ed. by Alfred Vierkandt (Stuttgart), pp. 659-680; translated as part V (pp. 237-280) of *Ideology and Utopia*. References are to the translation.
- I. 1934. "German Sociology," *Politica*, pp. 12-33.
- J. 1935. *Mensch und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Umbaus* (Leiden).
- K. 1936. "Preliminary Approach to the Problem," written especially for the English edition of *Ideology and Utopia*, pt. I, pp. 1-48.
- L. 1940. *Man and Society in an Age of Transformation* (New York). This work, a translation by Edward Shils of a revised and considerably enlarged version of J (see above), appeared too late to be included in the present discussion.

found than earlier ones, but this appears to be the case in the present instance.

Mannheim derives certain of the basic conceptions of Wissenssoziologie from an analysis of the concept "ideology."⁹ Awareness of ideological thought comes when an adversary's assertions are regarded as untrue by virtue of their determination by his life-situation. Since it is not assumed that these distortions are deliberate, the ideology differs from the "lie." Indeed, the distinction between the two is essential inasmuch as it emphasizes the unwitting nature of ideological statements. This, which Mannheim calls the "particular conception of ideology," differs in three fundamental respects from the "total conception." The particular conception views only certain of the opponent's assertions as ideological, that is, it grants to him the possibility of non-ideological thought; the total conception designates the opponent's entire system of thought as inevitably ideological. Again, the particular conception necessarily involves analysis on the psychological plane, since it assumes that the adversaries share common criteria of validity whereas the total conception is concerned with the noological level in which the form, content and conceptual framework of a "mode of thought" is conceived as unavoidably bound up with the life-situation. Finally, and as a corollary, the first view involves a "psychology of interests" (in much the same sense that the psychoanalyst operates with "rationalizations") whereas the second seeks only to establish a "correspondence" between the social setting and the system of thought. Thus, the latter conception does not require the imputation of *motives* but rests with the indication of understandable correspondences between modes of thought and the concrete situation.¹⁰ From these differences, it follows that the particular conception is implicitly individualistic, dealing with "group ideologies" only by "adding" the separate ideologies of its members or by selecting those which are common to the individuals in the group. The total conception, however, seeks to establish the integrated system of thought of a group which

⁹The correlative concept, "utopia," may be more advantageously discussed at a later point, since it is primarily relevant to Mannheim's views on the criteria of valid propositions.

¹⁰G, 50-51. Compare Scheler, *Versuche . . .*, p. 95. "Vor allem darf hier nicht die Rede sein von Motivationen und subjektiven Absichten der gelehrten und forschenden Individuen: diese können unendlich mannigfaltig sein: technische Aufgaben, Eitelkeit, Ehrgeiz, Gewinnsucht, Wahrheitsliebe, usw."

is implicit in the judgments of its members. (G, pp. 49-53.) The development from the particular to the total conception of ideology, which Mannheim traces with consummate skill, leads to the problem of "false consciousness," "the problem of how such a thing as . . . the totally distorted mind which falsifies everything which comes within its range could ever have arisen." (G, pp. 61-62.)

The particular and total conceptions are for the first time merged in Marxist theory which definitely shifted the emphasis from the psychological to the social plane. One further step was necessary for the emergence of a sociology of knowledge, the shift from a "special" formulation of the concept of ideology to a "general" formulation. In the special formulation, only our adversaries' thought is regarded as wholly a function of their social position; in the general, the thought of all groups, our own included, is so regarded. As Mannheim succinctly puts it, "With the emergence of the general formulation of the total conception of ideology, the simple theory of ideology develops into the sociology of knowledge. What was once the intellectual armament of a party is transformed into a method of research in social and intellectual history generally." (G, p. 69.)

Although the theory of ideology may be conceived as a parent of Wissenssoziologie, it is necessary to disown much of its heritage if it is to be a cognitive rather than a political discipline. The theory of ideology is primarily concerned with discrediting an adversary, *à tout prix*, and is but remotely concerned with reaching valid articulated knowledge of the subject matter in hand. It is polemical, aiming to dissipate 'rival' points of view. It is implicitly anti-intellectualistic. It would 'establish' truth by fiat, by sheer political domination if necessary. It seeks assent, irrespective of the grounds for 'acceptance.' It is akin to rhetoric rather than science. The implications of the theory of ideology are such that they must be openly repudiated if they are not to overshadow the essentially cognitive purposes of a sociology of knowledge. In point of fact, Mannheim seeks to eliminate the acutely relativistic and propagandistic elements which persisted in the earlier formulation of Wissenssoziologie.

Broadly speaking, the sociology of knowledge may be conceived as having two main branches: (1) theory and (2) "an historico-sociological method of research." The theoretical phase is in turn classifiable into (a) "purely empirical investigation

through description and structural analysis of the ways in which social relationships, in fact, influence thought"; and (b) "epistemological inquiry concerned with the bearing of this interrelationship upon the problem of validity." (H, p. 277.) The methodological phase is concerned with devising procedures for the construction of ideal types of the *Weltanschauungen* which are implied in the types of thought current in various social strata (social classes, generations, sects, parties, cliques, schools of thought). Through such articulated reconstructions, the concrete modes of thought are to be derived from the social "composition of the groups and strata" which express themselves in this fashion. (H, p. 277.) It is apparent, then, that the methodological branch of this discipline is closely linked with the theoretical branch (1, a; above). Thus we may revise Mannheim's classification and consider this discipline as involving two main classes of problems: those of a substantive Wissenssoziologie, which includes the empirical and procedural aspects, and those pertaining to the epistemological relevance of the sociology of knowledge. Although most commentators on Mannheim's work have centered their attention on his epistemological discussion, it would seem fruitful to devote more attention to the substantive sociology of knowledge, as indeed Mannheim himself recognizes. (H, p. 275.)

The scope of the substantive branch is reflected in its problems, concepts, theorems and canons of evidence. Thought is held to be existentially determined when it can be shown that it is not immanent or internally determined and when its genesis, form and content are significantly influenced by extra-theoretical factors. (H, p. 240.) [In Frederick Jackson Turner's words: "Each age writes the history of the past anew with reference to the conditions uppermost in its own time."] On the basis of empirical studies, it may be asserted that collective purposes and social processes lead to an awareness of various problems which would otherwise be obscured and undetected. It is in this connexion that Mannheim derives the problems which are the especial concern of Wissenssoziologie itself from intensive horizontal and vertical mobility in society, for only by thus coming into contact with radically different modes of thought does the participant-observer come to doubt the general validity of his own received forms of thought. Likewise, it is only when the usual institutional guarantees of a *Weltanschauung*—e.g., the Church, the State—are

shattered by rapid social change that the multiple forms of thought come to constitute a problem. Changes in the social structure such as these lead to the reexamination and questioning of *Selbstverständlichkeiten*, of what was formerly taken for granted. (J, p. 132 f.)

Others of Mannheim's theorems illustrate, in general outline, the correlations between thought and social structure which he seeks to establish. He submits the thesis that "even the categories in which experiences are subsumed, collected and ordered vary according to the social position of the observer." (G, p. 130.) An organically integrated group conceives of history as a continuous movement toward the realization of its ends; socially uprooted and loosely integrated groups espouse an ahistorical intuitionism which stresses the fortuitous and imponderable. The well-adjusted conservative mentality is averse to historical theorizing since the social order, *wie es eigentlich ist*, is viewed as 'natural' and proper, rather than problematical. Conservatives turn to defensive philosophical and historical reflexions concerning the social world and their place in it only when the *status quo* is questioned by opposing groups. Moreover, conservatism tends to view history in terms of morphological categories which stress the unique character of historical *configurations*, whereas advocates of change adopt an analytical approach in order to arrive at elements which may be recombined, through causality or functional integration, into new social structures. The first view stresses the inherent stability of the social structure as it is; the second emphasizes changeability and instability by abstracting the components of this structure and rearranging them anew. In a nation with expanding economic and territorial horizons, such as the United States, social scientists concern themselves with detailed investigation of isolated social problems and assume that the solution of individual problems will automatically lead to an adequate integration of the entire society. This assumption can flourish only in a society where vast possibilities and numerous alternatives of action provide a degree of elasticity which in fact permits some remedy for institutional defects. Contrariwise, in a nation such as the German, the limited field for action leads to a realization of the interdependence of social elements and thus to an organic view involving the entire transformation of the social structure rather than piecemeal reformism. (G, pp. 228-9; I, pp. 30-33.)

In similar fashion, Mannheim relates four types of utopian mentality—the Anabaptist chiliastic, the liberal-humanitarian, the conservative and the socialist-communist—to the particular social location and collective purposes of their protagonists. In this connexion, he shows that even the “historical time-sense” of these groups is influenced by their position and aspirations. Anabaptist chiliasm, deriving from the revolutionary ardor and “tense expectations” of oppressed strata, stresses the immediate present, the *hic et nunc*. The burgeoning middle classes who gave rise to liberal-humanitarianism emphasize the “idea” of the *indeterminate future* which, in due course, will witness the realization of their ethical norms through progressive “enlightenment.” The conservatives’ time-sense construes the *past* as inexorably leading to and indisputably validating the existing state of society. (“Whatever is, is in its causes just.” “One truth is clear, Whatever is, is right.”) Finally, the socialist-communist conceptions differentiate historical time in a more complex manner, distinguishing between the *immediate and remote future* while emphasizing that the *concrete present* embraces not only the *past* but also the latent tendencies of the *future*. By formulating these connexions between social location, collective aspirations and temporal orientation, Mannheim has advanced a field of study which is being increasingly cultivated.¹¹

It will be noted that the foregoing theorems pertain less to positive knowledge than to political convictions, philosophies of history, ideologies and social beliefs. And this at once opens a basic problem. Which spheres of “thought” are included in Mannheim’s theses concerning the existential determination (*Seinsverbundenheit*) of thought? Precisely what is embraced by the term “knowledge” to the analysis of which the discipline of Wissens-

¹¹Durkheim’s earlier sociological analysis of temporal frames of reference was wholly concerned with preliterate materials and (consequently?) did not treat differences in temporal orientation between groups in the same society. See his *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (London, 1915), pp. 10 f., 440 f.; also E. Durkheim and M. Mauss, “De quelques formes primitives de classification,” *L’Année sociologique*, VI (1901-2), pp. 1-71; H. Hubert and M. Mauss, *Mélanges d’histoire des religions* (Paris, 1909), chapter on “La représentation du temps.” For more recent discussions, see P. A. Sorokin and R. K. Merton, “Social Time,” *American Journal of Sociology*, XLII (1937), pp. 615-29; A. I. Hallowell, “Temporal Orientation in Western Civilization and in a Preliterate Society,” *American Anthropologist*, 39 (1937), pp. 647-70. Sorokin includes an extensive discussion of this subject in the forthcoming fourth volume of his *Social and Cultural Dynamics*.

soziologie is nominally devoted? For the purposes of this discipline, are there significant differences in types of knowledge?

Mannheim does not meet these issues specifically and at length in any of his writings. However, his occasional observations and empirical studies imply that he is persistently bedevilled by this fundamental question and, moreover, that he has failed to come to any clearcut, though provisional, conclusion concerning it. His failure in this respect introduces serious discrepancies between some of his theorems and specific empirical inquiries. "Knowledge" is at times used so broadly as to include every type of assertion and every mode of thought from folkloristic maxims to rigorous positive science. Thus, in an earlier formulation, he holds that "historical, political and social science thinking as well as the thought of everyday life" are all existentially determined. (F, p. 41.) Elsewhere, we learn that the social process penetrates into the "perspective" of "most of the domains of knowledge." Likewise, the content of "formal knowledge" [analytic statements? logic? mathematics? formal sociology?] is unaffected by the social or historical situation. (G, p. 150.) Such immunity is enjoyed by the "exact sciences" but not by the "cultural sciences." (H, p. 243.) Elsewhere, ethical convictions, epistemological postulates, material predications, synthetic judgments, political beliefs, the 'categories' of thought, eschatological doxies, moral norms, ontological assumptions and observations of empirical fact are more or less indiscriminately held to be "existentially determined."¹² The identification of different types of inquiry by subsuming them under one rubric serves only to confuse rather than to clarify the mechanisms involved in "existential determination." Different sets of ideas are used to perform different functions, and we are led to logomachy and endless controversy if we insist that they are to be "judged" as "essentially" similar. Mannheim is informed with this fallacy. Had he attended to the familiar distinction between the referential and emotive functions of language, such a miscellany would scarcely have remained undifferentiated. As I. A. Richards has phrased it, "The sense in which we believe a scientific proposi-

¹²Cf. E, p. 162; F, p. 41; K, pp. 22-23; G, pp. 71-72, 150; H, pp. 243, 260, etc. On this point, consult the vigorous criticism by Alexander von Schelting, *Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen, 1932), pp. 95, 99, n.2. Note also the relevance of I. A. Richards' observation that "Thought in the strictest sense varies only with evidence; but attitudes and feelings change for all manner of reasons." This is not to deny their concrete interpenetration.

tion is not the sense in which we believe emotive utterances, whether they are political, 'We will not sheathe the sword,' or critical, 'The progress of poetry is immortal,' or poetic."

Mannheim's failure to distinguish, in practice, the markedly heterogeneous types of 'knowledge' which he asserts to be *seinsverbunden* is particularly striking in view of his familiarity with Alfred Weber's useful distinction between cultural and civilizational knowledge.¹³ Fortunately, Mannheim's own investigations in substantive Wissenssoziologie have been concerned almost wholly with cultural materials (*Weltanschauungen*, eschatologies, political convictions) so that this confusion does not vitiate these studies. However, his more general theorems are rendered questionable by his use of an inadequately differentiated and amorphous category of 'knowledge.' This defect, moreover, interferes with any attempt to ascertain the status of the natural and physical sciences as far as "existential determination" is concerned. Had Mannheim systematically and explicitly clarified his position in this respect, he would have been less disposed to *assume* that the physical sciences are immune from extra-theoretical influences and, correlative, less inclined to urge that the social sciences are peculiarly subject to such influences.¹⁴

Mannheim's analysis is limited, as well, by his failure to specify the *type* or *mode* of relations between social structure and knowledge. This lacuna leads to vagueness and obscurity at the very heart of his central thesis concerning the "existential determination of knowledge" (*Seinsverbundenheit des Wissens*). Mannheim has evidently come to recognize (but not to surmount) this difficulty, for he writes:

Here we do not mean by 'determination' a mechanical cause-effect sequence: we leave the meaning of 'determination' open, and only

¹³As is clear from Mannheim's discussion in A, pp. 37, 48 and his passing comment on Weber's work in another connexion, G, p. 159. For a brief general discussion of this distinction, see R. M. MacIver, *Society* (New York, 1937), pp. 268-81; R. K. Merton, "Civilization and Culture," *Sociology and Social Research*, XXI (1936), pp. 103-13.

¹⁴For example, the recent empirical investigations by Borkenau, Hessen, Bernal, Sorokin, Merton are at least indicative that the role of extra-scientific factors in determining the direction of natural and of social science development differs rather in degree than in kind. For a theoretical formulation of this view, see Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York, 1937), p. 595 f. And, to anticipate our later discussion, there is no basis for assuming that the validity of empirical judgment is *necessarily* any more affected by these extra-scientific influences in the one case than in the other.

empirical investigation will show us how strict is the correlation between life-situation and thought-process, or what scope exists for variations in the correlation.¹⁵

Although it may be agreed that it is unwise to prejudge the types of relations between knowledge and social structure, it is also true that a failure to specify these types virtually precludes the possibility of formulating problems for empirical investigation. For, *nolens volens*, the investigator, and Mannheim's own empirical researches are a case in point, includes in his conceptual scheme or tacitly presupposes some conception of these relations. Thus, it is instructive to note briefly the various terms which Mannheim uses to refer to the relations between social position and knowledge. The following list is illustrative [*italics inserted*].

It was *in accord with the needs of* an industrial society . . . to base their collective actions . . . on a rationally justifiable system of ideas. (K, p. 33.)

The generation that followed Romanticism . . . [adopted] a revolutionary view as being *in accord with the needs of the time*. (G, p. 144.)

[The particular conception of ideology] refers to a sphere of errors . . . which . . . follow inevitably and unwittingly from certain *causal* determinants. (G, p. 54.)

. . . a given point of view and a given set of concepts, because they are *bound up with and grow out of* a certain social reality . . . (G, p. 72.)

When the social situation changes, the system of norms to which it had previously given birth ceases to be *in harmony with it*. The same estrangement goes on with reference to knowledge . . . (G, p. 76.)

. . . the intellectualistic conception of science, underlying positivism, is itself rooted in a definite *Weltanschauung* and has progressed *in close connection with* definite political interests. (G, p. 148.)

Socially, this intellectualistic outlook had its basis in a middle stratum, in the bourgeoisie and in the intellectual class. This outlook *in accordance with the structural relationship* of the groups representing it, pursued a dynamic middle course . . . (G, p. 199.)

Ideas, forms of thought, and psychic energies persist and are transformed *in close conjunction with* social forces. It is *never by accident* that they appear at given moments in the social process. (G, p. 223.)

It is no accident that the one group [ascendant *élites*] regards history as a circulation of *élites*, while for the others [*e.g.* socialists], it is a transformation of the historical-social structure. Each gets to see primarily only that aspect of the social and historical totality towards which it is oriented by its purpose. (G, p. 127.)

The several terms which nominally refer to the types of rela-

¹⁵H, p. 239, n. Wirth and Shils, the translators, add: "The German expression 'Seinsverbundenes Wissen' [*sic*] conveys a meaning which leaves the exact nature of the determinism open."

tions between the sub- and the superstructure are less a matter of stylistic diversity in prose than an indication of Mannheim's fundamental indecision. He uses the generic term "correspondence" (*Entsprechung*) to denote these relations. He has made a variety of unintegrated assumptions in his derivation of certain forms of thought from certain types of social situations. Some of these merit brief examination.

1. On occasion—despite his explicit denial of any such intention—Mannheim assumes a direct *causation* of forms of thought by social forces. This assumption is usually heralded by the oft-recurring phrase: "it is never an accident that . . ." a given theory will derive from a given kind of group position. (See, *e.g.*, H, pp. 248-9.) In this case, Mannheim adopts the natural-science view of "*Erklärung*" in which the general rule "accounts for" aspects of the particular instance.

2. A second assumption may be termed the "interest assumption" which holds that ideas and forms of thought are "in accord with," that is, gratifying to, the interests of the subjects. In one form, it is simply a doctrine of the influence of vested interests—economic, political, religious—in which it is to the advantage of the subjects to entertain certain views. Thus, an advantageously situated group will presumably be less receptive than a socially disadvantaged group to talk of extensive social reform or revolution. The acceptance or rejection may be deliberate or unwitting.¹⁰ This assumption is found in *Vulgärmarxismus* which, repudiated by Mannheim as it was by Marx, is occasionally implicit in the former's writings.

3. A third assumption is that of "focus of attention." According to this, the subject limits his perspective in order to deal with a particular problem, directly practical or theoretical. Here thought

¹⁰The occasional vogue of such "interest theories" as affording allegedly adequate explanations is itself a *wissenssoziologische* problem which merits further study. Particular varieties are found in some of the inferences drawn from the postulate of an "economic man," the "conspiracy theory" in political science, the excessive extension of "rationalization" and "propaganda" concepts in psychology, the "priestly lie" notion of Voltaire, the "religion-an-opiate-for-the-masses" cliché. Of course, the occasional currency of these views may be due to the fact that "they work," that, up to a certain point, they "account for" human behavior and are consonant with a wider body of knowledge. It is not irrelevant, however, that in all, when action and thought can be ascribed to "ulterior" (especially if "disreputable") motives, the behavior is said to be explained. Curiosity is satisfied: X is a special pleader, a tool of vested interests, a Bolshevik, a Hamiltonian banker. The assumption common to these several versions is the Hobbesian notion of egoism as *the* motive force of conduct.

is directed by the very formulation of the problem, awareness of which may in turn be attributed to the social position of the subject. Roughly, it may be asserted that this hypothesis is stressed in the substantive sociology of knowledge whereas the "interest hypothesis" is emphasized in the theory of ideology.

4. On quite another level is Mannheim's occasional treatment of given structures as simply prerequisite to certain forms of thought. In this, he joins with Scheler in speaking of "certain types of groups in which . . . [these forms of thought] alone can arise and be elaborated." (H, pp. 242-3.) Much of Mannheim's analysis has to do with the establishment of preconditions or even "facilitating factors" rather than with necessary and sufficient conditions. Instances are numerous. Social mobility *may* lead to reflexion, analysis, comprehensiveness of outlook; it may equally well lead to *insouciance*, superficiality, 'confirmation' of one's prejudgments. Or to take another theorem: the juxtaposition of conflicting views *may* induce reflexion, as summarized in the instrumentalists' aphorism, "conflict is the gadfly of thought." But such conflict may also evoke fideism, inconclusive anxieties, skepticism. Or still again, advantageously located classes ("conservatives") *may* be loath to theorize about their situations, but it is hardly permissible to ignore the alienated nobility who turned to the Encyclopedists' social theories or the "renegades" who are socially bourgeois but spiritually proletarian or their proletarian counterparts who identify themselves with the bourgeois ethos. All this is not to deny the suggested correlations but only to set forth, in company with Mannheim himself, the need for a more circumstantial analysis of the many structural factors which are involved. Mannheim's discussion in terms of prerequisites shades into the view of "existential determination" as referring simply to empirical correlations between society and knowledge, in which the very uniformity is taken to establish the "correspondence." On this level, analysis is all too often halted once the correlation is indicated.

5. Still another implied relation between social structure and knowledge involves what may be termed an "emanationist" or "quasi-aesthetic" assumption. In this view (particularly marked in B and F), Hegelian overtones are not altogether absent. Such terms as "compatibility," "congruity," "harmony," "consistency," and "contrariety" of *Weltanschauungen* usually signalize the emergence of this assumption. The criteria for establishing these rela-

tions are left implicit. Thus, we read: "The absence of depth in the plastic arts and the dominance of the purely linear correspond to the manner of experiencing historical time as unilinear progress and evolution."¹⁷ It should be noted, however, that this particular assumption plays no large part in Mannheim's substantive researches. The vestiges which do remain are more significant as a sign of his uncertainty concerning the types of relation between knowledge, culture and society than as an indication of idealistic presuppositions in his theory.¹⁸

A more extensive discussion of the substantive and methodological aspects of Mannheim's work would include a detailed treatment of the procedures of analysis he has adopted. His attempt to set forth a systematic "code of techniques" suffers from brevity and excessive generality. These failings would only be multiplied by those of any commentator who ventures an epitome of an already epitomized version. (H, pp. 276-8.) However, one obstacle confronting the first of these procedures—an explicit articulation of the presuppositions common to "single expressions and records of thought"—should be noted. At least so far as beliefs are concerned, it is at present often impossible to determine whether cultural values are consistent or inconsistent, in advance of the actual social situations in which these values are implicated. Thus, if the question is raised, in abstraction from concrete cases of *behavior*, whether "pacifism" and "abolitionism" are compatible or incompatible, the answer must be indeterminate. One can equally well conclude, on the abstract cultural plane of "belief," that these two value-systems are random (mutually irrelevant), consistent or in-

¹⁷G, p. 200. Mannheim's frequent comparisons between "styles" in the history of art and in intellectual history usually presupposes the quasi-aesthetic assumption. Compare Scheler, *Versuche . . .*, pp. 92-3, who speaks of the "stilanalogen Beziehungen zwischen Kunst (und den Künsten untereinander), Philosophie, und Wissenschaft der grossen Epochen" and of the "Analogien zwischen der französischen klassischen Tragödie und der französischen mathematischen Physik des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts, zwischen Shakespeare und Milton und der englischen Physik . . ." and so on. Spengler and Sorokin have developed this theme at some length.

¹⁸This is but a special case of the more general problem of establishing types of social and cultural integration. Mannheim's practice, despite the absence of systematic formulation, marks a distinct advance over that of Marxist epigoni. An explicit formulation of a logic of relations between cultural values is provided by P. A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York, 1937), Vol. I, pp. 7-53. In so far as he deals with "cultural integration" and ignores its relation to social organization, Sorokin leans toward an idealistic interpretation. A brief, but provocative, discussion of the problem is found in C. Wright Mills, "Language, Logic and Culture," *American Sociological Review*, IV (1939), pp. 670-80. For a specific criticism of Mannheim on this point, see Schelting, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-115.

consistent. In the case of the Quakers, adherence to both these values involved integrated action for the abolition of slavery without resort to violence whereas Garrison and his disciples, initially advocates of non-resistance, retracted their pacifist views in order to get on with the war to abolish slavery. It should be noted that prior to the occurrence of this situation, there was little basis for assuming any conflict between the values of abolitionism and pacifism. If anything, the cultural analyst might be tempted to consider these values as components of an integrated value-system labelled "humanitarianism." Abstract cultural synthesis which seeks to reconstruct the "underlying unity of outlook" may thus lead to false inferences. Abstractly inconsistent values are often rendered compatible by their distribution among various statuses in the social structure so that they do not result in conflicting demands upon the same persons at the same time. Potential conflict of values may be obviated by their segregation in different universes of discourse and their incorporation in different social roles. Failure to recognize that the organization of values among social roles may render abstractly conflicting values compatible would lead, for example, to the thesis that the Catholic Church maintains incompatible values of celibacy and fertility. In this case, conflict and malintegration is largely avoided, of course, by attaching these values to different statuses within the church organization: celibacy to the status of priest and unrestricted fertility to the married laity. Systems of belief, then, must be examined in terms of their relations with the social organization. This is a cardinal requirement of both *Sinngemässe Zurechnung* and *Faktizitätszurechnung*, as described by Mannheim. (H, pp. 276-7.)

There remains now to be considered the most disputed phase of Mannheim's writings, namely, his claims for the epistemological consequences of the sociology of knowledge. These need not be examined in full detail, since many critical expositions are available.¹⁹ Moreover, Mannheim acknowledges that the substantive results of Wissenssoziologie—which are the most distinctly reward-

¹⁹The most elaborate of these is by Schelting, *op. cit.*, pp. 94 f. See also his review of *Ideologie und Utopie* in *American Sociological Review*, I (1936), pp. 664-74; Günther Stern, "Ueber die sogenannte 'Seinsverbundenheit' des Bewusstseins," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, LXIV (1930), pp. 492-502; Sjoerd Hofstra, *De sociale Aspecten van Kennis en Wetenschap*, (Amsterdam, 1937), pp. 39-51; Paul Tillich, "Ideologie und Utopie," *Die Gesellschaft*, VI (1929), pp. 348-55 (privately circulated English translation by James Luther Adams),

ing phase of the field—do not implicate his epistemological conclusions.

The controversy centers about Mannheim's conception of the general total ideology which, it will be remembered, asserts that "the thought of all parties in all epochs is of an ideological character." This leads at once, it would seem, to radical relativism with its familiar vicious circle in which the very propositions asserting such relativism are *ipso facto* invalid. That Mannheim perceives the logical fallacy and intellectual nihilism implicit in such a position is abundantly clear. Thus, he explicitly disclaims the irresponsible view that "sees in intellectual activity no more than arbitrary personal judgments and propaganda." (G, p. 89, n.) He likewise repudiates "the vague, ill-considered and sterile form of relativism with regard to scientific knowledge which is increasingly prevalent today." (H, p. 237). How, then, does he escape the relativistic impasse?

In perhaps an unduly simplified form, we may classify Mannheim's efforts to avoid the relativistic fallacy and to establish *points d'appui* for the validity of his own judgments under three major rubrics: "Dynamic Criteria of Validity," "Relationism," and "Structural Warranties of Validity."

1. *Dynamic Criteria of Validity.* Mannheim introduces several "dynamic criteria of validity" of historical judgments. "A theory . . . is wrong if in a given practical situation it uses concepts and categories which, if taken seriously, would prevent man from *adjusting himself at that historical stage.*" (G, p. 85; italics inserted.) ". . . knowledge is distorted and ideological when it fails to take account of the new realities applying to a situation, and when it attempts to conceal them by thinking of them in categories which are inappropriate." And in a note, Mannheim adds: "A perception may be *erroneous or inadequate to the situation* by being in advance of it, as well as by being antiquated." (G, p. 86 and n. 1.) It is apparent, however, that the criterion of "adjustment" or "adaptation" begs the question unless the type of adjustment is specified.²⁰ Numerous, even contradictory, theories may enable man to "adjust" in one fashion or another. "Social adjustment" is a

²⁰ As had long since been indicated by Max Weber in his discussion of "diesen viel misbrauchten Begriff," the concept of "social adaptation" has a large variety of meanings, none of which are scientifically useful. See his *Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 477 f.; see further, Schelting, *op. cit.*, p. 102 f.

normative rather than an existential concept. Moreover, the determination of the "appropriateness" or "inappropriateness" of categories presupposes the very criteria of validity which Mannheim wishes to discard. It is perhaps these obscurities and ambiguities which led him to evolve other criteria of validity by introducing the concept of "utopia."

"Only those orientations transcending reality" are utopian "which, when they pass over into conduct, tend to shatter, either partially or wholly, the order of things prevailing at the time." (G, p. 173.) In this sense, utopian, in contrast with ideological, thought is true rather than illusory. The difficulty of this view is at once evident. How, at any given time, is the observer to discriminate between valid utopian thought and distorted ideological thought? Moreover, since, as we have just seen, conceptions may be "inadequate to the situation by being in advance of it," how is one to choose the valid from amongst the invalid "advanced ideas"? Mannheim recognizes these embarrassments, but his "solution" is of dubious value. It not only involves an *ex post facto* criterion of validity but also precludes the possibility of valid judgments on contemporary ideas, as may be seen from the following passage.

... if we look into the past, it seems possible to find a fairly adequate criterion of what is to be regarded as ideological and what as utopian. This criterion is their realization. Ideas which later turned out to have been only distorted representations of a past or potential social order were ideological, while those which were adequately realized in the succeeding social order were relative utopias. . . . The extent to which ideas are realized constitutes a supplementary and retroactive standard for making distinctions between facts which as long as they are contemporary are buried under the partisan conflict of opinion. (G, p. 184.)

As Schelting has shown, this retroactive criterion presupposes the very criteria of validity which Mannheim wishes to supplant, for how else is the observer to demonstrate that his "reading" of the historical process is correct? A lengthy and detailed analysis, far beyond the compass of this paper, would be necessary to demonstrate further difficulties inherent in this position. However, Mannheim moderates this view considerably in another attempt to circumvent radical relativism.

2. *Relationism.* Mannheim sketches three possible positions on the question of the bearing of the genesis of an assertion upon its validity. The first denies "absolute validity" [*sic*] to an assertion

when its structural sources are demonstrated.²¹ Contrariwise, the second holds that such demonstration has no bearing whatever on the "truth-value" of the assertion. Mannheim's own conception mediates between these extremes. Identification of the social position of the assertor implies only "the suspicion"—a probability—that the assertion "might represent merely a partial view." Such identification also particularizes the scope of the assertion and fixes the limits of its validity. This attributes to Wissenssoziologie a considerably more modest role than was claimed in Mannheim's earlier formulations, as is evident from his own summary.

The analyses characteristic of the sociology of knowledge are, in this sense, by no means irrelevant for the determination of the truth of a statement; but these analyses . . . do not by themselves fully reveal the truth because the mere delimitation of the perspectives is by no means a substitute for the immediate and direct discussion between the divergent points of view or for the direct examination of the facts.²²

In expounding his relationist views, Mannheim clarifies the concept of "perspective" (*Aspektstruktur*), which denotes "the manner in which one views an object, what one perceives in it, and how one construes it in his thinking." Perspectives may be described and imputed to their social sources by considering: "the meaning of the concepts being used; the phenomenon of the counter-concept; the absence of certain concepts; the structure of the categorical apparatus; dominant models of thought; level of abstraction; and the ontology that is presupposed." (H, p. 244.)

By this time, Mannheim has come almost full circle to his point of departure; so much so that his present observations may be readily assimilated to those by Rickert and Max Weber. "Situationally determined" thought no longer signifies inevitably ideological thought but implies only a given "probability" that the occupant of a given place in the social structure will think in a certain fashion. (H, p. 264.) The validity of propositions is no longer ascertained through *wissenssoziologische* analysis but through direct investigation of the object. Again, the "particularizing func-

²¹Throughout, Mannheim imputes a doctrine of "absolute truth" to those who reject a radically relativist position. (E.g., H, pp. 270, 274.) This is gratuitous. One may grant different perspectives, different purposes of inquiry, different conceptual schemes and add only that the various results be translatable or integrated, before they are judged valid.

²²H, p. 256. Similarly, in his more recent essay, Mannheim writes: "It is, of course, true that in the social sciences, as elsewhere, the ultimate [*sic*] criterion of truth or falsity is to be found in investigation of the object, and the sociology of knowledge is no substitute for this." (K, p. 4.)

tion" of the sociology of knowledge simply assists us in ascertaining the limits within which generalized propositions are valid. What Mannheim calls "particularization" is, of course, nothing but a new term for a widely recognized methodological precept, namely, that whatever is found true under certain conditions should not be assumed to be true universally or without limits and conditions. Bridgman and Sorokin have termed this the "principle of limits"; Dewey calls its violation "*the philosophical fallacy*"; in its most prosaic and widely known form it is described as the "*fallacy of unwarranted extrapolation.*"

Mannheim's conception of "perspectivism" is substantially the same as the Rickert-Weber conception of *Wertbeziehung* (which holds that values are relevant to formulation of the scientific problem and choice of materials but are not relevant to the validity of the results).²³ Both views depart from the premises of an inexhaustible multitude of phenomena, the inevitability of selection from these in terms of a conceptual scheme and the relevance of values and social structure to this scheme and the formulation of the problem. Indeed, as early as 1904, Külpe and the psychologists of the Würzburg school had shown experimentally that the nature of problems (*Aufgaben*) largely determined the form and content of perception and observation.²⁴ The Gestalt psychologists and the Lewin school have more recently extended these findings on the directive influence of *Aufgaben*. Rickert, Weber and especially Mannheim seek to add a sociological dimension to this signal dis-

²³See Rickert, *Die Grenzen . . .*, pp. 245-271. ". . . die Geschichte ist keine wertende sondern eine wertbeziehende Wissenschaft." Cf. Weber, *Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 146-214. "Es gibt keine schlechthin 'objektive' wissenschaftliche Analyse des Kulturlebens oder . . . der 'sozialen Erscheinungen' unabhängig von speziellen und 'einseitigen' Gesichtspunkten, nach denen . . . als Forschungsobjekt ausgewählt, analysiert und darstellend gegliedert werden." (p. 170.) But "Die Beziehung der Wirklichkeit auf Wertideen, die ihr Bedeutung verleihen und die Heraushebung und Ordnung der dadurch gefärbten Bestandteile des Wirklichen unter dem Gesichtspunkt ihrer Kulturbedeutung ist ein gänzlich heterogener und disparater Gesichtspunkt gegenüber der Analyse der Wirklichkeit Gesetze und ihrer Ordnung in generellen Begriffen." (p. 176.)

²⁴See O. Külpe, "Versuche über Abstraktion," *Bericht über den Internationalen Kongress für experimentelle Psychologie*, 1904, pp. 56-69; C. C. Pratt, "The Present Status of Introspective Technique," *The Journal of Philosophy*, XXI (April 24, 1924), p. 231: "As far as accurate observation and unequivocal report are concerned, an observer is adequate only to those aspects of a given experience which the determining tendency brings clearly into line with the particular *Aufgabe* of the moment; other aspects of that experience fall at various distances outside the sphere of immediate observation and hence cannot be made the objects of scientific description." Cited in Ralph M. Eaton, *Symbolism and Truth* (Cambridge, 1925), p. 17 f.

covery by showing that cultural values and social structure in turn determine the formulation of the *Aufgaben* which direct observation along certain lines. Thus, this particular phase of the sociology of knowledge is clearly integrated with the findings of experimental researches in psychology. It will be noted, however, that these experiments do not indicate that the validity of the observations focussed in this manner is thereby to be impugned.

In part, Mannheim's inconsistency in his earlier writings stems from an indefinite distinction between incorrectness (invalidity) and perspective ("onesidedness"). Perspectival statements are presumably not incorrect, *if* their author recognizes and allows for their partial nature; they are then simply abstract formulations of certain aspects of the concrete situation. They are, however, definitely invalid if they are submitted as significantly complete representations of the phenomena in question (Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concreteness"). The line between invalidity and 'mere' perspectivism is, then, scarcely as distinct as Mannheim seems to imply. His present emphasis upon the recognition and proper discounting of perspective as essential to valid thought in social science appears to be little more than a restatement of the notion of *Wertbeziehung* and, as such, returns him to the Rickert-Weber fold from which he presumably departed.²⁵

3. *Structural Warranties of Validity.* Thus far, Mannheim has sought to provide grounds for validity *within* the limits of given perspectives. He is still faced, however, with the problem of evaluating the relative merits of diverse particular views and further, of validating what he calls the "dynamic syntheses" of these several views. In short, if intellectual anarchy is to be avoided, there must be some common ground for integrating the various particularistic interpretations. In his *Ideologie und Utopie* he submits a "solution" which, despite modifications, is strongly reminiscent of Hegel and Marx. Hegel's idealistic historicism guaranteed its own truth by positing that the "absolute Geist" had come into its own in Hegel's philosophy inasmuch as history had at long last attained its goal. For Marx, the same kind of postulate finds the prole-

²⁵The discrepancy between this interpretation and that of Schelting, who systematically criticizes Mannheim on the basis of Weber's *Wissenschaftslehre*, is more apparent than real. Schelting treats Mannheim's work as a whole in which the early and later portions are often juxtaposed. Here, we deal with Mannheim's writings as representing a development in the later stages of which the departure from Weber becomes increasingly attenuated.

tariat as the present exponents of an immanent historical process which opens to them alone the possibility of undistorted social thought. And Mannheim finds a structural warranty of the validity of social thought in the "classless position" of the "socially unattached intellectuals" (*sozialfreischwebende Intelligenz*). These efforts to rescue oneself from a relativistic impasse by positing a group which is immune from relativism parallel Münchhausen's feat of extricating himself from a swamp by pulling on his whiskers.

Seinsverbundenheit which for others renders opaque all but a limited perspectival slice of knowledge falls away for the intellectuals. (D, pp. 115-120; F, p. 67 f.) The role of the intelligentsia becomes a kind of reassuring palliative for an implicit relativism. The intellectuals are the observers of the social universe who regard it, if not with detachment, at least with reliable insight, with a synthesizing eye. To them is vouchsafed, as to Marx's proletariat, the outlook which permits a rounded view of the concrete historical situation and, as for Marx, this privilege derives from their peculiar position within the social structure. Thus, Mannheim indicates that the intellectuals are able to comprehend the various conflicting tendencies of the time since they are "recruited from constantly varying social strata and life-situations." (K, p. 10; G, p. 139.) In the *Communist Manifesto*, we read: "the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population." Mannheim asserts that the intellectuals are structurally free from distorted interpretations inasmuch as they are "consciously or unconsciously . . . interested in something else than success in the competitive scheme that displaces the present one." (G, p. 232; "es bewusst oder unbewusst stets auch auf etwas anderes ankam, als auf das Hineinarrivieren in die nächste Stufe des sozialen Seins.") Engels, in his essay on Feuerbach, reminds us that "only among the working class does the German aptitude for theory remain unimpaired. . . . Here there is no concern for careers, for profit-making, or for gracious patronage from above." However all this may in fact be, it is clear that in the case both of the intellectuals and the proletariat, mere structural position of the stratum is not in itself enough to validate their conceptions. And indeed, Mannheim seems to have come to this conclusion, for in a later article, he acknowledges the necessity of a "common denominator" and a formula for "translating" the results derived from different perspectives. (H, p. 270; "eine Formel der Umrechenbarkeit und Uebersetzbarkeit

dieser verschiedenen perspektivischen ineinander . . .") However, in this connexion, it is not asserted that only the structurally warranted intellectuals can forge these syntheses. Nor does Mannheim satisfactorily indicate how the "translation of one perspective into the terms of another" is, on his view, to be attained. Once given the existential determination of thought, who is there to judge among the babel of competing voices?

It appears then that in drawing epistemological consequences from the sociology of knowledge Mannheim has been led to various unresolved antinomies. Doubtless further modifications of his position along lately adumbrated lines will bring him to a tenable and integrated system of analysis. As for the veritable revolution in the theory of knowledge which he sees as deriving from an appropriate extension of *Wissenssoziologie*, it can be said that in its bold outlines this epistemology has for some time been familiar to the American mind. It is that of Peirce and James, mediated by Dewey and Mead, in which thought is seen as but one among many types of activity, as inevitably linked with experience, as understandable only in its relations to noncognitive experience, as stimulated by obstacles and temporarily frustrating situations, as involving abstract concepts which must be constantly reexamined in the light of their implications for concrete particulars, as valid only so long as it rests upon an experimental foundation.²⁰ To this, Mannheim has contributed a valuable analysis of the role of social structure in directing and activating thought.

The critical tone of the foregoing discussion should not be misleading. Mannheim has sketched the broad contours of the sociology of knowledge with remarkable skill and insight. Shorn of their epistemological impedimenta, with their concepts modified by the lessons of further empirical inquiry and with occasional logical inconsistencies eliminated, Mannheim's procedures and substantive findings clarify relations between knowledge and social structure which have hitherto remained obscure. Fortunately, Mannheim recognizes that his work is by no means 'definitive'—a term which strikes a harsh discord when applied to any work of science—and we may await considerable enlightenment from his further explorations.

²⁰In his most recent book, Mannheim indicates his agreement with many features of pragmatism. *J.*, p. 170 f. He shares also the precepts of operationalism in several respects which cannot be examined here. See, for example, *H.*, pp. 254, 274-5.

Irrationality and Planning:

A Note on Mannheim's *Man and Society in an Age of Transformation*

EDWARD SHILS

The great voices of the Western European enlightenment speak once more in Karl Mannheim's latest book.¹ The goals of the Enlightenment—freedom, material well-being and peace—and its methods—empirical observation, rational inference, and reasonable persuasion—are restated here in the heavy language of contemporary social science. More difficulties in the way of their operation are perceived, and the analysis of the causes for our present great divergences from these aims is vastly more differentiated and realistic than could be found in the writing of, for example, Helvétius or James Mill. But in focusing his attention on why irrationality in the instrumentation of ends has acquired its present importance and in his assumption that the ends which he prefers will be preferred by others once they are adequately informed as to consequences and equipped with the necessary insight into what is expedient, Mannheim places himself in the line which proceeds directly from the French 18th and the English 19th centuries.

It is, of course, no longer a claim to distinction merely to assert that irrationality is the source of our present troubles. Mannheim's analysis of the causes of the large amount of affective and traditional irrationality in recent years, does, however, merit serious consideration. His argument is as follows: Modern large-scale organization, in business, in government, in political parties, etc., is necessarily attended by the concentration of power, and accordingly of initiative, in relatively few hands. The rest of the society, to varying degrees, fits itself into the patterns prescribed by the power-wielding elite and, in restricting itself to carrying out the orders which trickle down the hierarchies of which most of the population constitute the lower sectors, it gradually develops a "trained incapacity" to plan things for itself on any extensive scale, to make its own decisions, and to exercise initiative when presented with alternative courses of action. The rigorous requirement for conformity with specified patterns of action which large-scale private and public enterprise make on the individuals, whose adherence to these prescriptions is necessary for the realization of the ends of their superiors, not only leads to the atrophy of the ability to decide and the narrowing of the field of attention, but it also disregards his subjective demands for gratification, affection and esteem, (except where the satisfaction of these demands is directly conducive to the more efficient operation of the organization). The consequent frustrations generate anxieties which are released in irrational ways. Thus, the rationalization of social organizations, i.e., the management and coordination of the actions of their individual members with exclusive reference to the most efficient attainment of a given goal, (Mannheim calls this "functional rationaliza-

¹MAN AND SOCIETY IN AN AGE OF TRANSFORMATION. With a bibliographical guide to the study of modern society. Translated by Edward Shils. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940. 469 pp. \$3.50

tion")), while requiring the maximum in rationality from those who coordinate, deprives those who are coordinated of the chance to develop their capacity for rationality. Then, when the rank and file is impelled to action to alleviate the tensions which functional rationalization, and other situations to be mentioned below, bring about, they are incompetent to act rationally.¹

Irrationality in thought and action i.e., incorrect inference and the unadaptedness of means to ends, which Mannheim calls "substantial irrationality," is heightened by an independent factor, namely, the instability of the economic system. It does this by disrupting the routines which the individual maintains only very tenuously in the midst of a continually changing environment. But as long as the routines which the individual establishes in his private life exist, they allow for an orderly release of tensions and thus prevent the anxiety-level from mounting. This, however, is rendered impossible for the rank and file of the population whom the downward movements of the trade cycle affect most heavily. Unemployment and with it the decline in self-esteem, the hopelessness of achievement in a career, and the changed round of daily life promote aggressions which, given the individual's psychological equipment, are most likely to be released irrationally. Were the aggressive attitude accompanied by insight into the source of the deprivations and by a capacity for rationally efficacious remedial action, the triumph of fascism in some countries and the threat of it in others would not be so great as it has been. Unable to arrive at their decisions independently and unhinged from their customary norms, the working and lower middle classes are accessible to fascist agitation, which once it is successful re-coordinates their behavior by directing it toward "substitute goals," such as military glory, racial pride, etc., in place of the earlier goals of economic success and social distinction. (Mannheim calls the provision of unstable "substitute goals" the "organization of insecurity.")

To these factors in the causation of irrational behavior should be added several more which are widely operative in modern urban capitalistic society. Among these, Mannheim treats the breakdown of primary group and community controls. With the loss of influence over the individual by the family, church, and neighborhood, and with the school providing only a very inadequate substitute, the individual is left to set his own ends and to devise his own ways of attaining them. Functional rationalization and the instability of the environment provide subjective and objective obstacles to the achievement of this task, which is difficult enough even for those with greater insight into the interconnections of events and with greater self-control. The mobility of the population from place to place, and from one social status to another, merely aggravates this situation, since it puts the individual into situations in which he is either ignorant of what should be done or is tempted to get away with whatever he can. And in the case

¹It is interesting to compare Mannheim's views regarding the irrationalizing consequences for the rank and file of modern industrial organization with those of Veblen. Early in the present century, the latter declared that modern industrial work promoted an empirical instrumentalistic attitude, and in so doing furthered the worker's capacity for rational behavior. (Cf. his *Theory of Business Enterprise*.)

of the latter, the guilt feelings which arise from norm-infringement are projected on to others and provide an acceptable justification for irrational acts of destructive aggressiveness.

One component of the breakdown of community control is the loss of prestige by the élites on whom the work of providing the directing norms for the society, outside the economic and political spheres as well as in them, falls in an orderly society. Our own society has witnessed, according to Mannheim, a number of changes in the characteristics of the élites which have prevented them from performing these norm-providing activities. As a result of increased objective opportunities for social ascent, together with the stimulation of the desire for social advancement on the part of segments of the population which in earlier centuries had resigned themselves to their negatively-privileged positions, governmental, social, and intellectual élites became more heterogeneous in their composition and more vehement in their competition for ascendancy. In consequence of the former, the norms emanating from the élites lost their unity and therewith part of their authoritativeness. Recency of arrival and eagerness for the attention of the public led to the production of analyses and programs which were lacking in thoroughness and maturity. The attacks against each other of the competing élites and counter-élites contributed to the general discrediting of their products in the eyes of those whom they sought to lead.

"Substantial irrationality" is of major practical significance because of two phenomena which Mannheim refers to somewhat darkly, as "interdependence" and "fundamental democratization." Although he neither defines them explicitly nor supplies concrete illustrations, it may be said that by the "interdependence" of modern society, he means that each part of the society is more affected by what happens in any other part of the society than was the case in earlier periods before the unification of economic system through national and international markets and the attendant diminution of economic and political self sufficiency; by "fundamental democratization," which is one particular form of "interdependence," he refers to the great importance of the mass of the population (a) in the formation of political decisions, either by elections and the acquisition of office, or merely by being taken into account by those in power, and (b) the higher social status of the mass in comparison with the relatively lower status of the mass in preceding centuries. By virtue of its "fundamental democratization," modern society is defined as a "mass society." As such, it confers on the irrationalities, described above, tremendous weight. Mannheim is under no illusions as to the prevalence of irrationality in the lower classes in non-capitalistic societies. But, he declares, the irrationality was traditionalistically oriented, it was on the whole highly routinized, and it had no eruptive repercussions except on very rare occasions. Whatever explicit and central coordination society received was not motivated by the same kind of traditionalistic irrationality as existed in the lower strata. In modern capitalistic society, however, the irrationalities of the mass are not bound and guided by tradition; they are much more effective than before,

and, what is more, these effective irrationalities penetrate into the contents of political decisions which affect the whole society. (This takes on a special significance with the expansion of governmental activities.) But the rank and file of the population influences governmental decisions not just by voting and the exertion of "pressure"; its members or the offspring of its members, unschooled in rational self-control and inexperienced in bearing responsibilities and making decisions, have entered increasingly into the various élites. With them, they have brought a combination of affective and traditionalistic irrationality which had never before been so important in those positions. At the same time, the entry of representatives, offspring and former members of the lower strata into the domain of the *raison d'état*, into the world of power politics, where ethical rules have always been weaker as motives than considerations regarding the maintenance or improvement of one's power position, resulted in the diffusion into the lower classes, of the cynical "expedientialism" which in the past had been the almost exclusive possession of the upper strata,¹ and even there applied only in certain spheres.

These are Mannheim's main propositions regarding contemporary society. There are many more subsidiary ones, formulated more or less explicitly, but those already summarized are enough to indicate his conception of the causes of certain of the ethically disagreeable aspects of the present age. Mannheim is not merely an analyst of contemporary society as an heir of the enlightenment; he is also concerned with its improvement; and, accordingly, a large part of his book is a rough blueprint for a planned society.

There is no doubt for Mannheim that planning is necessary. It is in any case inevitable—although the grounds for its inevitability are not gone into—and since it is inevitable it is desirable to make the best of it. It is, however, also necessary, if the values of liberal-humanitarian society are not to be lost, and we must therefore "use all our intellectual energy towards finding a combination of social controls which would determine how far individual liberties should be left unrestricted in order to preserve both the freedom of the individual and the efficiency of the community." The only feasible alternatives which confront mankind today in Mannheim's view are those between dictatorial planning, i.e., planning without freedom for the planned, and a liberal-socialistic type of planning, i.e., "planning for freedom."

Observation of the totalitarian regimes has led to the view, widely held, that planning and dictatorship are identical, that planning necessarily involves dictatorial power, and furthermore that the expansion of governmental control over private economic activity must end ultimately not only in the loss of entrepreneurial liberties but of all other significant liberties as well. These are the arguments which Mannheim sets himself to refute; and the results, though far from conclusive, are unsurpassed in modern

¹It is interesting to note the appearance of a very similar insight in the recent book by George Orwell, *Inside the Whale* (London, 1940), where he says, "the ordinary people in the western countries have never entered mentally into the world of realism and power politics. They may do so before long." (p. 84) He is at variance with Mannheim only as to the time at which the entry takes place.

social science and social philosophy.¹ One difficulty in particular should be pointed out. Mannheim is too vague about the type of economic system which he envisages for the regime of freedom-and-planning which he presents. Most of his statements are applicable to either state-regulated capitalism (different only in degree from what already exists in the United States and England) or a type of democratic socialism. Mannheim suggests a number of indispensable institutions, the most important of which are a popularly elected parliament, constitutional controls to guarantee the stability of long-range plans, interest representation on advisory councils, and a number of other arrangements known to specialists in administration and law but not ordinarily introduced into sociological analyses, and in any case absent for many years from discussions of social and economic planning.

The whole discussion could, however, have been much strengthened had Mannheim characterized the economic organization of his planned society more exactly. It would not be asking for too much to criticize Mannheim for not having presented one or both of the above-mentioned economic systems in greater detail and for not having examined with greater concreteness particular institutions intended for control over bureaucratic excesses and for the guarantee of specific freedoms. He proposes central control over investment (which is, of course, possible in both controlled capitalism and democratic socialism) and then says nothing of how freedom of the press would be maintained. He praises the work of voluntary associations and foundations, as pioneers and as guarantors of independence from control by state bureaucracies, and then says nothing about their role under either of his two possible economic systems (except to imply that they would not exist). He is rather light-heartedly optimistic about the possibilities of parliamentary control over bureaucratic experts. He assumes the existence of parties but says nothing of the lines of partisanship and how they might influence planning. Yet despite its generality, it is a pioneer attempt, and nothing in the recent planning literature is superior to it with respect to the serious problems attacked and the richness of the suggestions.

How is such a regime to be achieved? Here Mannheim is properly reticent. His task was to demonstrate the practicability of a regime of liberal planning once it is achieved, but the achievement itself is a tactical question depending on the political constellation at any particular moment. Naturally such a program will appeal to moderately left progressives and socialists, but in England some conservatives too, long accustomed to extensive governmental intervention and attached to the liberties of the individual citizen, have welcomed it enthusiastically. Mannheim himself speaks in the name of no party and offers no concrete suggestions which politicians and statesmen might use in steering toward his goal. But if he provides no specific proposals for those in the political arena and offers them

¹Unfortunately Mannheim does not address himself to Professor Frank Knight's contentions in "Nationalism and Economic Theory" (in *The Ethics of Competition* [New York, 1936]).⁴ Professor Knight's most recent publication on the subject "Socialism: The Nature of the Problem (*Ethics*, L [1940] pp. 253-289), appeared too late to be cited by Mannheim.

only a long range goal, he does make greater demands of the intellectuals, in particular the social scientists.

The social scientists are given the responsibility of supplying the knowledge which is necessary if plans are to be effective. To distinguish between the type of proposition which was adequate in the liberal age and that which is needed for planning, Mannheim introduces the terms "inventive" thinking and "planning" thinking. The former is characterized by analytical propositions which do not account for any concrete situation exhaustively while "planing" thinking uses "*media principia*" which are more complex propositions made up of analytical propositions. Media principia tell us exhaustively the conditions under which concrete events take place, and when translated from contemplative into manipulative language, they tell us the concrete conditions which have to be supplied if a given concrete end is to be attained. In order to be able to obtain such concrete propositions, analytical propositions are of course still necessary; but a further requirement is the substantive integration of the social sciences. Mannheim asserts, rightly enough, that no one of the social sciences as they exist today and as formally defined by those who like to insist on the separateness and independence of their "sciences," e.g., sociology, economics, political science, psychology, anthropology, etc., disposes over the data needed for the construction of *principia media*.¹ For this reason, it is necessary to do away with the existing departmental divisions, which Mannheim believes are a result of the theory that there are different domains or spheres of human activity in reality, of the sharp disjunction between economic activity and non-economic activity in 18th and 19th century doctrine and practice, and finally of the accidents of university administration and the responsiveness of university people to practical issues. Psychologists must become sociological, sociologists must become psychological, economists must become sociological—each must learn from all.

The preceding pages have attempted to reformulate and rearrange Mannheim's views in a somewhat different way from that which he himself follows, but which in the opinion of the present author makes the interrelations of the different segments of the book clearer than they otherwise are. This review has not mentioned the shortcomings of the book. They are numerous: the formulations are seldom free from ambiguity; the propositions remain too frequently on the level of generality and are accompanied neither by the corroborative evidence which is available in many cases nor by illustrations which would heighten the plausibility of those propositions which are still in the hypothetical stage; his discussion of methodology is too much influenced by arguments against trivial opponents, viz., the German "formal" sociologists and by failure to recognize sufficiently that much of what he recommends is already in practice. Nonetheless, it is a book of major importance, not just for what it contains, which is very much, but also for the numerous crucial problems it raises, the many leads for insight which it provides.

¹For that matter, the analytical propositions do not restrict all their terms to the data claimed by any one particular discipline either, but Mannheim does not mention this.

Book Reviews

TWO REVIEWS OF TIGNER¹

DR. CUMMINS' REVIEW

It is not likely that the fire of democracy will become extinguished. Perhaps it has come perilously close to that, but this fact will have a tendency to lend to it a more tangible meaning henceforth. Democracy is not a system devised to keep a certain political party in power, but a method of developing human beings as a whole, and under such a system no principle other than the unselfish principle can motivate people. If Jesus' standard of living, rather than his divinity, can be accepted as the common way of life, then democracy will be accepted as a matter of course. Our problems are not so much economic and materialistic as they are spiritual. People need to change their attitude toward other people. War is the result of some form of selfishness. Dictatorship is the result of spiritual poverty. There must be an emphasis upon good-will. Laws are but the evidence of the way people progress inwardly. Yet, in continuing democracy as a process, Christianity is at stake. The success of democracy depends upon the success met in bringing individuals to a spiritual level where they are qualified citizens of a democracy. That is the perennial problem of democracy.

Hugh Tigner is not one who believes there is an easy answer to this problem, or who thinks the answer will take the form of sheer novelty unalloyed. His thesis is "that the Hebrew-Christian religion contains truths which are not only still valid but also indispensable for the preservation and advance of civilization; that modern culture made a fatal mistake in trying to cast those truths aside as the outworn garments of an immature age; and that our saving help lies in a rediscovery of this religion, a re-establishment of its spiritual authority, and a fresh conversion to its outlook, insight and value."

The book's title is derived from the guerilla forays which the author launches so relentlessly against our modern culture, its prodigality of paganism, over-optimism, riotousness and unmorality. The method of science is praised but its weakness is brought out in bold relief. The picture of our high-riding political totalitarianism is portrayed with all the vivid coloring of which Tigner's style and charm are capable. What he points out so clearly is that we have lost our way, and God knows this is true. Suppose it *has* been said before. So also have the words attributed to Jesus. Most things have been said before, and some of them deserve repetition.

It is the sound philosophy running through the entire work which gives me a thrill. There are doubtless others in our midst who have read as much philosophy as Tigner, but evidently he also reads *Life*, *The New Yorker*, and *True Romances*. What he does is meaty. He hits the nail on the head and at the same time chooses just the poem, just the reference, just the experience, which plucks occasionally at the heart-strings. From the ninth century on to the Reformation was an order of society in which the will of God, not man's wish, was the determinative factor. This, as Tigner sees it, gave to the culture of Western Europe "an integrity of being." . . . "No

¹OUR PRODIGAL SON CULTURE. By Hugh Stevenson Tigner. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co., 1940. 162 pp. \$1.50.

phase of living dwelt apart from the whole. . . . Man's living was seen surrounded by the universal and eternal" salvation. "Through that end all the affairs of life were related."

The author is not pleading for a return to medievalism. He merely points out that just prior to the Renaissance the world was God's world and that from that day to this the world has gone over to the many gods of our sundry secularisms, there being no law of human relatedness or mutuality.

And what does it all come to now? To the same old three words: "God is Love"—brought up-to-date, stream-lined, given new teeth, or whatever you please, but the same old definition nevertheless. No mere platitude, mind you! This time it is structural law. He says he cannot draw the blue-print. How refreshing it is to find such a candid soul. Of course he cannot. I dare say he could do a better job, however, than many who believe they can (or some of his critics). Tigner's great wisdom lies in the fact that he admits there is a blue-print and that he is determined to spend his life discovering its details. Tigner loves liberty, but he recognizes what too many liberals do not recognize, namely, that liberty comes only by obedience to the law. Genuine freedom comes only through self-discipline. Yes, I get a kick out of his flashes of humor, the evidence of passion for his fellowmen, his clean-cut logic, the twinkle that is back of his irony, but it is his basic philosophy that counts.

Then too, when he says that we should turn to essential Christianity for our way out—and to the church as the first step in this direction—he refers to no lavender and old lace Christianity, no stereotyped, straight-jacketed, traditional church. He has in mind a Christianity which recognizes and observes the "law" of God, and that history reveals this law by the very logic of events, that there is inevitable consequence for violation, inevitable reward for obedience. Only as we keep to the law is there any real gain—spiritual gain.

The importance of maintaining the church, we have all known, is greater today than ever. This country is now spending billions of dollars to defend its concept of national life, but it must also defend democracy from within, so that in protecting the form we do not lose the essential spirit. As a citizen, I see a great need for intelligent enthusiasm for our democratic way of life. Flag-waving is not enough; nor is it sufficient to be willing to die for our country. We must have a thorough understanding of the democratic process if we are to so live that democracy can survive, and I believe our Church must play a vital part in achieving that understanding.

In *Our Prodigal Son Culture* Tigner has produced a work which, so it seems to me, should be read and re-read by every minister and lay person interested in a religion of freedom. It is one of the few books which ministers might do well to mark "Must."

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ROBERT CUMMINS.

DR. ELIOT'S REVIEW

In his opening chapter, the author of this brilliant and provocative book states his purpose to be the exposition of a thesis which he sets forth in these words: "that the Hebrew Christian religion contains truths which are not only still valid but also indispensable for the preservation and advance of civilization; that modern culture made a fatal mistake in trying to cast these truths aside as the outworn garments of an immature age; and that our saving help lies in a rediscovery of this religion, a re-establishment of its spiritual authority, and a fresh conversion to its outlooks, insights and values."

It must have taken considerable courage to formulate so tremendous a theme for a book in these days, and there is no doubt that Mr. Tigner is a brave man. In his very next sentence, he says he is aware "that this thesis will at once strike many people as absurd," but the present reviewer is of the opinion that the only absurdity about it would be to expect any man to fulfill the promise it contains within the limits of a book of 162 pages. Mr. Tigner has a gift for brevity, for saying a great deal in a few words; but his thesis is altogether too vast to be adequately dealt with by any writer in so small a compass. In his final chapter he admits as much, and holds out a slightly tentative promise of other books to follow. It is to be hoped that his promise may be fulfilled, for it is perfectly clear that a new star has appeared in the firmament of liberal religious thought. It may be too early to hazard a guess as to its magnitude, but there can be little doubt that it is more than a meteor.

Of the three parts of the thesis which is announced as the subject of the book, it is the second that receives by far the greater part of the author's attention. The subtitle of the book—"A Critical Comment on Modern Culture from the Standpoint of the Christian Religion"—gives fair warning; but it seems a pity that the proportions should not have been more nearly equal. There is no adequate treatment of what Mr. Tigner means by the "Hebrew-Christian religion," no satisfactory statement of the "truths" of that religion which are "not only still valid but also indispensable for the preservation and advance of civilization," no analysis of the elements of "civilization" which deserve to be preserved or advanced. That first section of his thesis just has to be taken for granted, which puts a rather heavy demand upon the minds of some of us. How far can anything we may legitimately call "Christian" be considered valid and useful today? That is not an easy question to answer, but it is basic if we are to talk intelligently about a "rediscovery" of this religion or the "re-establishment of its spiritual authority." And one cannot help wishing that Mr. Tigner had devoted at least a third of his pages to explaining what he has in mind when he speaks of the "outlooks, insights and values" to which he recommends "a fresh conversion."

To the second of the three parts of his thesis Mr. Tigner devotes not only the major part of his book but also the full strength of his marked critical ability. No smug, self-satisfied liberal can read his analysis of the defects

of the philosophy of romantic optimism which went by the name of "liberalism" at the turn of the century without knowing that the armour of his complacency has been pierced by thrust after thrust from a very keen sword. No unthinking believer in the superiority of our so-called modern culture can read the chapters entitled "The Lyrical Modern Epoch" and "Crisis in a Far Country" without admitting that his placid faith in the "New Civilization" has been pretty badly shaken. It is a searching and, at certain points, devastating indictment of our modern values, as a whole and in particular, for which even those of us who are not convinced that it is true should be grateful.

But it would carry more conviction—this indictment of our Prodigal Son culture—if its author showed evidence that he really understands what he so cleverly and wittily attacks. In his seventh chapter, he lists four of what he calls our "great secular confidences," and points out how each of them has "suffered a pitiful crumbling." The New Civilization, according to Mr. Tigner, was supposed to produce four values—the establishment of a more genuinely universal community, the elimination of fear, a new respect for human nature, and a new discovery of the meaning and purpose inherent in the universe, by the use of science as a key to all knowledge and truth, and it isn't very difficult to show that none of these values has actually been achieved. In the next section of the same chapter, he lists nine of our "formerly most trusted assets"—our business and financial institutions, science, the printing press, education, our liberal-democratic-laissez-faire political system, our spiritual theory that life is made rich through the emancipation of the individual from restraints and obligations, personal success as the touchstone of our business religion, the noble calling of commerce as the agent for spreading the benefits of civilization, and nationalism; and he has a grand good time deriding our simple-minded confidence in each of them. Nobody could deny that much of what Mr. Tigner says is true, but it is seldom the whole truth; and it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that his satisfaction in "debunking" as a form of indoor sport has run away with his clearness of vision and, at least once in a while, with his sense of fair-play.

One example will suffice. He is speaking of nationalism, which he calls "the crowning phenomenon of the modern epoch" and "the great millstone about our necks." He quotes six lines from one of Rupert Brooke's sonnets, and then goes on to write these lines: "When young Rupert Brooke, along with ten million other men, lost his life in the Great War, just what was the meaning of that libation of blood? It is a question that will hardly bear thinking about. He thought he was making some corner of a foreign field forever England. Well, if he was, what of it? But he wasn't. England, like all empires, will not be 'forever.' Brooke was, however, making some foreign fields England's for a limited period of time: he helped make some of Mesopotamia's oil England's—or at least, the preserves of some of England's traders; he helped put down, for a generation, England's chief rival in maritime commerce and imperialistic diplomacy, he helped replace Kaiser Wilhelm II with Adolph Hitler, and to raise Italy from a second-rate power to a first-class menace. Believing that he was helping to storm

the last formidable barricade in the path of human advance, Brooke was participating in the beginning of the Great Disintegration."

I object to that sort of thing because it so completely misses the point. Anyone who can read Rupert Brooke's lines,

"If I should die, think only this of me:
That there's some corner of a foreign field
That is forever England's. . . ."

and then say, "He thought he was making some corner of a foreign field England. Well, if he was, what of it?" is simply incapable of understanding the one thing that has made nationalism a force in the world of men and women. The sneers about oil and loin cloths and gin and tin whistles are not worth answering—not because there is no valid argument behind them, for there is, but just because they are sneers. Many things have happened in the world since this book was published—one of them has shown that Italy is anything but "a first-class menace"—and it may be hoped that Mr. Tigner has changed his tone of voice, if not his mind, in the light of recent events.

Of the nation which Mr. Tigner appears to take special pleasure in deriding, Mr. Walter Lippmann recently wrote, "The British have proved to this smart and unbelieving, this clever and neurotic generation, that in the calculation of chances sheer valor is a force." It seems to me that there is more power of spiritual insight behind those words than you can find in all the writing of the cynics and scoffers who, with a good deal in the way of facts to back them up, still fail to see that nationalism is at the core of it a spiritual thing.

In the same way, unless one is aware of the genuine spiritual elements in our modern faith in science, in education, in the idea of progress—yes, even in the business world and the "white man's burden"—one is not qualified to criticise the selfish and short-sighted and sadly exaggerated hopes which have frequently vitiated the faith in these "assets" of culture. Mr. Tigner's chapter on the Middle Ages shows that he possesses the imagination and insight required for this kind of criticism, but he hasn't used them in the major portion of his present book, and this is the chief reason why his critical comment on modern culture is so uncritical.

Having said this, it remains to commend *Our Prodigal Son Culture* to every thoughtful religious liberal, and especially to our ministers. It is "good medicine" for what many liberals don't as yet even suspect is the matter with them. It is a jolting sort of book, often irritating, always readable and entertaining. If it isn't to be taken too seriously, that is the fault of the writer, who hasn't taken with sufficient seriousness the tremendous theme to which he has addressed himself. Some day, and one hopes it may be soon, Mr. Tigner should write the book which his brilliant mind and courage plainly qualify him to produce.

The American Unitarian Association,
Boston, Mass.

FREDERICK M. ELIOT.

MR. TIGNER'S REJOINDER

Dear Editor:

You suggest that some sort of answer to Dr. Eliot's criticism of my book might be in order. I am not strongly inclined to think so. For one thing, authors are seldom pleased by any review that does not praise them to the skies. Remembering that tends to bluff me out of answering criticisms, even those that seem to me unfair or based on misunderstanding. For another thing, I think Dr. Eliot deals with me as fairly as I have dealt with a whole lot of authors in my reviewing days.

With one exception, I think he has scented the weaknesses of the book and fallen upon them in my own style. The book is certainly fragmentary, and the debunking part of it certainly stands out more irritatingly and even more clearly than the edifying parts, though there's some reverence in the book that Dr. Eliot wasn't allergic to. Some of his criticism is due to the fact that we have different estimates of modern culture, and a different understanding of this particular juncture of history. It is pointless to answer that sort of criticism, because all one can do is to reassert what he has already asserted. I have gradually grown away from orthodox liberalism, but am enough of a liberal not to damn a man because he disagrees with me.

What Dr. Eliot has to say about me and England and Italy and Rupert Brooke and nationalism is not a well taken point. There was a footnote somewhere in the middle of my book indicating that most of it was written one year before the European war broke out. Dr. Eliot, if he had stopped and thought twice about the problem this presents, might have congratulated me on having written a book that wasn't completely irrelevant and out of tune with the times by the time it finally got published. How could I know that Italy would turn out to be something less than a first class menace? Didn't Dr. Eliot himself think that the Maginot Line was almost impregnable? All the military experts on this side of it thought so, and they were all wrong. My point is that up until France collapsed last May, I, along with Dr. Eliot and 200,000,000 other people, was living under a number of illusions. Some of the things we all said two and three years ago have become silly now. I admit it and repent. One thinks and writes in a context today quite different from that of 1938, and so writes and thinks differently. But I should have thought this too obvious a fact to bring up.

I would write differently about England today; but she has been guilty of all the sins I spoke against her. I still think Rupert Brooke was mistaken. I still think the record proves that the First World War was the beginning of the Great Disintegration. As for nationalism, I clearly recognize it as one of the great forces of the modern world, and I still say that we've got to transform and transcend it, but I also recognize that we shall have to use it too. I not only recognize the force of patriotism, but I believe in it. Dr. Eliot has read things into some of my statements that are not there, and he has made the mistake of interpreting things I said a good while ago in the light of contemporary awareness. This is criticizing me for not having the wisdom of God, a wisdom I have never claimed.

Except for this section of his review I think he has picked out the defects of the book with keen insight.

HUGH S. TIGNER.

DEMOCRACY AND ITS FOES WITHIN

Two volumes¹ by Walton Cole, though published a year ago, have gained in significance since their publication. Timely then, they are more timely now. Both consist of addresses delivered over the radio, one a series of eighteen, the other a series of eight. The addresses deal with topics which the war clouds then gathering on American horizons suggested, and now that the clouds have thickened, their contents may be read with sharpened interest. As is well known to the readers of *THE JOURNAL OF LIBERAL RELIGION*, Mr. Cole became on the radio the spokesman of those who foresaw danger to our democratic institutions in Father Coughlin's demagogery, and through this a warner against all propaganda inspired from abroad. Included in the volumes are his analysis of the inner meaning of the "voice from Royal Oak" and his revelation of the sources of other propaganda. They make interesting reading today.

The addresses however are not all warnings "against." Such topics as "The American Way," "Neutrality," "The Hope of America," and "The Use and Abuse of Freedom of Speech" are constructively treated. The treatment is of necessity popular and the illustrations are of the moment, but the principles suggested are of lasting importance. An address in the larger volume "There must be no Black-out Here" discusses the "black-out" of democracy which in times like these Americans must resist—black-outs of tolerance and freedom by the intolerant, the bigoted, the racialists and the cynics.

Preachers who have or expect to have opportunities to speak on the air will read these addresses with especial interest. They are examples of popular treatment of liberal themes that we know to have caught the public ear. There are ways to catch and hold the attention of the man whose finger on a button can wipe out in a moment the sound of a voice, and Mr. Cole shows one way in which it can be done.

The Meadville Theological School

SYDNEY B. SNOW.

¹THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE. By Walton E. Cole. Toledo Committee, Unitarian Fellowship for Social Justice, 1939. 295 pp.

THE CHOICE BEFORE US. By Walton E. Cole. A series of eight radio addresses, delivered under the auspices of The Unitarian Fellowship for Social Justice, 1940. Eight addresses, separately paginated, bound in paper volume.

A number of "communications" concerning our summer issue (1940) on religious symbolism are being held for publication in the next issue of *THE JOURNAL*, which will be largely devoted to this subject. It should be noted *en passant* that a recent issue of *The New Humanist* published some comments on Mr. Ohrenstein's editorial in our summer issue on "Language and Liberal Religion."